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ABSTRACT

Cummins, Joshua Isaac. M.A., Department of Political Science, Wright State University, 2012.
“Hearts and Minds: US Foreign Policy and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East, An
analysis of Public Perceptions from 2002-2011”.

The literature on anti-Americanism in the Middle East suggests that there is a strong
relationship between US foreign policy and public attitudes of the United States in the region.
This study analyzes Middle Eastern public opinion of the United States from 2002 until 2011,
while using quantitative and qualitative analysis to determine whether US foreign policy in the
Middle East correlates with approval levels of the United States. The purpose of this study was
to determine if US foreign policy measures such as US support for oppressive regimes, US
support for Israel, and US intervention in domestic affairs affects the way in which the average
Middle Eastern publics view the United States. The study finds that there were quantitative and
qualitative correlations between the three independent variables and anti-Americanism levels in
the Middle East with the largest drop in approval of the US coming in 2003 after the US invasion
of Iraq. The case of Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution also shows an effective policy that can be
applied to the regime changes caused by the “Arab Spring”.
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1. Why Do “They” Hate “Us”?: How did the United States Lose the Middle East?
“Policy differences, not cultural differences, are the basis for Muslim antiAmericanism.”
Stephen Brooks 1
1.1 Introduction
Do perceptions matter? This question is intrinsically significant when addressing
the United States’ relationship with the Middle East. Mark Tessler and Michael Robbins
argue that negative public perceptions of the United States in the Middle East can be a
significant factor contributing to an increase in terrorism. “Societal support, whether
implicit or explicit,” Tessler and Robbins write, “is often a critical facilitator for terrorist
organizations, allowing them to conduct operations more frequently and more easily.” 2
Those who harbor negative perceptions of the United States might not necessarily
become terrorists themselves, but they would more likely support acts of terrorism
against the United States. Steven Kull contends that societal support for terrorism in the
Middle East is directly linked with public perception. “Hostility toward the United States
in the broader society plays a critical role in sustaining terrorist groups,” Kull writes,
“even if most disapprove of those groups’ tactics. The essential ‘problem,’ then, is one of
America’s relationship with Muslim societies as a whole.” 3 Shibley Telhami agrees that
the threat of terrorism remains a huge concern and makes Middle Eastern public opinion
much more important than it may have been in the past. Telhami also claims that public
perception in the Middle East matters because public opinion does have an effect on state
1

Stephen Brooks, As Others See Us: The Causes and Consequences of Foreign Perceptions of America,
(Ontario: Broadview Press, 2006) 132.
2
Mark Tessler, Michael D.H. Robbins, “What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of
Terrorist Acts Against the United States?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 2 (April, 2007), 305.
3
Steven Kull, Feeling Betrayed: The Roots of Muslim Anger at America, (Washington D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 2011), 8.
1

policy. With the expansion of information technology and social networks, states no
longer have the ability to withhold information from their publics. 4 This popular support
of terrorism is a necessary condition for terrorist organizations to achieve if they wish to
sustain their agenda. Winning back this popular support also becomes crucial for the
United States if it intends to halt the increase in terrorism.
The public perception of the United States in the Middle East has been a topic of
concern and an extensive area of interest, especially since the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001. However, neither terrorism against the United States, nor the
negative perception of the United States in the Middle East began with September 11.
Since the mid 1980s the United States has been a target for religious extremists and
terrorism based on these beliefs. The 1983 car bombing of the United States Marine
Corps barracks in Lebanon, the 1996 Khubar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia, the 1998
bombing of United States’ embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and the 2000 attack on the
USS Cole are examples of debilitating terrorist attacks against United States’ targets. 5
Ussama Makdisi argues that negative perceptions of the United States, or antiAmericanism in the Middle East, emerged after World War II when the United States
focused on the Middle East for its oil and began to support the new state of Israel. 6 In the
following section, I address the research questions and a review of the literature.

4

Shibley Telhami, The Stakes: America and the Middle East, The Consequences of Power and the Choice
for Peace, (Colorado: Westview Press, 2002), 70-71.
5
Terrorism Project, “Chronology of Major Terrorist Attacks Against U.S. Targets,” Center for Defense
Information, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/chronology.html (accessed November 1, 2010)
6
Ussama Makdisi, “Anti-Americanism in the Arab World: An Interpretation of a Brief History,” The
Journal of American History 89, no. 2 (September, 2002), 547.
2

1.2 The Research Questions
After September 11, many in the United States wondered, why do they hate us?
The question may also be posed as what causes negative perceptions of the United States
in the Middle East? This question spawned several schools of thought. Some blamed the
United States’ foreign policy, arguing that a history of failed policies including: support
for Israel, foreign interference in domestic affairs, and support of oppressive regimes
were the reason for the surge of negative perceptions. Others call it a “clash of
civilizations” and implicate the radical ideology and conflicting values of extremists and
radical groups in the region for spreading hatred of the United States.
What does increasing negative public perception mean for the United States?
Following September 11 and the subsequent “war on terror”, the United States has been
involved in two separate wars for almost a decade. Some argue that its presence in the
region may be leading to increased negative perception of the United States and thus
creating a vicious cycle. 7 Without changing its public image in the Middle East, the
United States runs the risk of spreading hatred of itself and feeding extremists with
recruits for terrorist activity. How can the United States improve its public perception in
the Middle East? The literature singles out three variables leading to negative perceptions
of the United States in the Middle East. These include: (1) the United States’ support for
Israel, (2) the United States’ support for oppressive regimes, and (3) the United States’
intervention in domestic affairs. This study isolates these independent variables during
the selected time period. Analysis will be performed on the public perception in the
Middle East over a ten year time span from 2002 to 2011. A chapter will be dedicated in
an attempt to isolate each variable in order to determine if there is a causal chain between
7

Robert A. Pape, “It’s the Occupation, Stupid,” Foreign Policy (October 18, 2010).
3

the independent variables and public perception, and if so, which variable(s) cause the
largest upsurge of anti-Americanism.

1.3 Literature Review of Anti-Americanism in the Middle East
The literature on anti-Americanism in the Middle East does not date back
very far. It emerged in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Several scholars such as Samuel P. Huntington looked for the next form of opposition to
the United States, and he found this opposition in the ideological and cultural differences
of the Middle East. The first Gulf War in 1990-91 also contributed to the belief that
America may find opposition in the Middle East. The increase in terrorist attacks against
the United States which culminated with September 11, 2001, led to a huge increase in
literature on anti-Americanism in the Middle East. The literature has largely been split
into two separate arguments; the “our fault” argument and the “their fault” argument. 8
The “our fault” claims that it is the United States’ foreign policy that directly causes
negative public perceptions of the United States. The “their fault” contends that
conflicting values and norms, and the increase in extremism cause some in the Middle
East to hate the United States. The literature on anti-Americanism in the Middle East has
been anchored by these two arguments which have largely dominated the debate. In the
following, I discuss the literature on this debate, examine any flaws or gaps in the
research, and establish how I will contribute to the debate.

8

Vaughn Shannon, “Why/Who/Hates Us? Distinguishing Militants from the Merely Muslim,” Harvard
International Review, (March 2, 2007).
4

A Historical Perspective of Anti-Americanism
Some scholars such as Ussama Makdisi, Marc Lynch, and Stephen Walt argue
that one cannot understand anti-Americanism unless one approaches it from a historical
perspective. Makdisi criticizes scholars and US policy makers who believe that those in
the Middle East hate the United States and that the cause of the hatred is “immaterial and
obscure.” 9 Walt contends that the history of the United States’ actions is extremely
important because other countries see this history as a “guide to its future conduct.” 10
When a country views another country’s actions as negative it will be more suspicious of
this country in the future. Walt insists that “past crimes can also generate a desire for
vengeance.” 11 Makdisi claims that anti-Americanism emerged directly after World War II
with the United States’ support of the state of Israel in 1947 and the United States’
intervention in states such as Saudi Arabia because of their abundance of oil. While
Lynch contends that in the 1950s and 1960s, the United States was remote and not
present in Middle Eastern affairs, and that there were even periods of pro-Americanism,
such as after the Suez Crisis. 12 Makdisi argues that the Cold War only increased antiAmericanism in the region. The United States was concerned with rising Iranian and
Arab nationalism, as exhibited by the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
in 1951 and the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956. Makdisi contends that these
events led to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) led coup against Iranian Prime
Minister Mohammed Mossadeq in 1953 and caused an immense increase in antAmerican sentiment in the Middle East region. Walt agrees that the United States did as
9

Makdisi, “Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 538.
Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy, (New York: Norton,
2006), 90.
11
Walt, Taming American Power, 90.
12
Marc Lynch, “Anti-Americanisms in the Arab World,” Anti-Americanisms in World Politics, (New York:
Cornell University Press, 2007), 199.
10

5

much as it could during the Cold War to undermine communism. “Along the way, the
United States helped overthrow at least nine freely elected governments,” Walt writes,
“while turning a blind eye to the brutal behavior of an unsavory array of anticommunist
dictators, including some of its authoritarian allies in the Middle East and Persian
Gulf.” 13 Lynch further argues that “anti-Americanism only began to take on its
distinctive coloration after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, when U.S. support for Israel
reshaped a relatively fluid Arab political opinion into a more pervasive distrust.” 14
Makdisi claims that this new found anti-Americanism was a “historic clash between
reactionary forces of imperialism and the progressive forces of revolution.” 15 This
involves the United States’ support for “retrograde regimes” instead of progressive
regimes. These negative views of the United States at this time were not based on
religion; they emerged from a secularist nationalist perspective. 16
However, Makdisi argues that Islamist anti-Americanism quickly emerged
because of the corruption and ineffectiveness of Arab nationalist regimes and the
perception that the United States represented an “antagonist secular and un-Islamic
history, culture, and civilization.” 17 Arab nationalism was further weakened by the defeat
by Israel in the Six Day War of 1967, and the Islamist movement garnered its largest
success with the Iranian Revolution in 1979. “The Islamist anti-American sentiment that
came to the fore during the Iranian revolution”, Makdisi writes, “was ironically and
unintentionally exacerbated by covert U.S. and Saudi mobilization, training, and

13

Walt, Taming American Power, 89.
Lynch, “Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 199.
15
Makdisi, “Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 549.
16
Makdisi, “Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 550.
17
Makdisi, “Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 550.
14

6

financing of Muslim fighters to repel the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.” 18 Makdisi
contends that anti-Americanism sentiment grew steadily throughout the 1980s and 1990s
as a result of American hegemonic influence in the region, support for Israel, propping up
of corrupt authoritarian regimes, and their presence in Saudi Arabia after the first Gulf
War in 1991. 19 Walt asserts that the cruise missiles fired into Afghanistan, the air strikes
against Iraq, the subsidizing of Israel’s occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank,
and the killing of thousands of civilians during their occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq
has laid the ground for anti-Americanism in the Middle East. 20
Walt used the term “historical amnesia” to describe how the United States views
its own history. This describes how many in the United States may attempt to forget the
negative actions taken by their country. This misremembering can be done by the media,
policy makers, or average citizens. Walt insists that victims’ memory of suffering or pain
inflicted on their country fades very slowly, but that the United States will go to
considerable lengths to forget their actions. 21 This phenomenon does not only apply to
the United States, and in some cases it can be much more severe in other countries with
less free and open societies. Walt further argues that even when the country has
recognized and admitted its wrong doings, it will still attempt to justify its actions as
necessary for their national security. “Historical amnesia” can also happen when the
leaders of a country misrepresent their actions as being provoked or justified, when in
reality they were not. Walt claims that this creates a very different understanding of
reality for citizens, and in some cases could cause Americans to be unaware of what the

18

Makdisi, “Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 551.
Makdisi, “Anti-Americanism in the Arab World,” 551-2.
20
Walt, Taming American Power, 89.
21
Walt, Taming American Power, 104-5.
19

7

United States has done to other countries. 22 This is especially significant because it
causes Americans to be unable or unwilling to understand why those in another country
may have negative perceptions of the United States. “The consequences of this sort of
historical amnesia can be severe,” Walt states, “especially in an era when countries
around the world are even more attentive to U.S. behavior and even more worried about
what the United States might do.” 23

The Different Arguments Regarding the Causes of Anti-Americanism
The literature on public perceptions of the United States in the Middle East has
largely been split into two separate arguments; the “their fault” argument and the “our
fault” argument. The “their fault” argues that conflicting values and norms, and the
increase in extremism cause some in the Middle East to hate the United States. Shannon
writes, “The “their fault” camp suggests that anti-US sentiments and violence result from
radical ideology, incompatible values, psychological malaise, and political exploitation
that fuels some elites and groups to hate the United States and its values and policies.” 24
The “our fault” argument contends that it is the United States’ foreign policy that directly
causes negative public perceptions of the United States. Shannon further writes, “The
‘our fault’ studies suggest US actions and policy have fueled anti-US sentiments that lead
to violence against US citizens and institutions.” 25 In the following I discuss these
competing arguments and point out the different variables that each argument puts forth.

22

Walt, Taming American Power, 106.
Walt, Taming American Power, 106.
24
Shannon, “Why Who Hates Us? Distinguishing Militants from the Merely Muslim,” Harvard
International Review, (March 2, 2007).
25
Vaughn Shannon, “Why Who Hates Us?”.
23

8

1.4 The “Their Fault” Argument
Some scholars believe that anti-Americanism has emerged in the Middle East
because of “who we are.” They believe contrasting values, culture, and religious
differences spawn hatred of the United States in the Middle East. Walt writes, “From this
perspective, opposition to the United States is an inevitable, and thus unavoidable,
reaction either to the concentration of power in U.S. hands or the specific political and
cultural values that the United States represents.” 26 Scholars have argued that those in the
Middle East have blamed the United States for their own domestic problems, are
apprehensive of the United States’ power, or have used cultural or religious differences to
advance hatred of the United States.
Some argue that those in the Middle East have expanded anti-American sentiment
through blaming the United States for their own economic or political problems. Barry
Rubin writes, “Anti-Americanism has served as a means of last resort by which failed
political systems and movements in the Middle East try to improve their legitimacy.” 27
This blaming of the United States has occurred more by the political leaders who try to
take pressure off themselves in times of economic or political turmoil. Rubin states, “The
United States is blamed for much that is bad in the Arab world, and it is used as an
excuse for political and social oppression and economic stagnation.” 28 In turn, allowing
leaders to divert attention away from their own oppressive or failing policies. Instead of
focusing on increasing equality, developing the economy, or creating a democracy, the

26

Walt, Taming American Power, 70.
Barry Rubin, “The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism,” Foreign Affairs (November-December,
2002) 1.
28
Rubin, “The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism,” 1.
27

9

focus turns to hating America. 29 Fouad Ajami agrees that anti-Americanism in the
Middle East occurs because the leaders blame the United States for the deteriorating
political condition. Ajami asserts that the United States should not worry about winning
over hearts and minds because those that hate the United States will continue to spread
anti-Americanism regardless of what the United States says or does. “If Muslims truly
believe that their long winter of decline is the fault of the United States,” Ajami writes,
“no campaign of public diplomacy shall deliver them from that incoherence.” 30
Bernard Lewis argues that societies in the Middle East have been blaming others
for their own misfortunes for hundreds of years. He claims that first the Middle East
placed blame on the Mongols for their failing civilizations. With the rise in nationalism,
the Middle East then turned their blame toward the Turks, who ruled over them during
the reign of the Ottoman Empire. By the nineteenth and twentieth century, Lewis argues
that the Middle East turned their blame toward Western imperialism, which started with
hatred of the British and the French and then eventually transitioned into hatred of the
United States. 31 Rubin further argues that leaders in the Middle East ignore the many
times the United States supported Arab or Muslims in times of conflict and only focuses
on the United States’ support for Israel. He claims that in 11 out of 12 major conflicts
between Muslims and non-Muslims or between Arabs and non-Arabs, the United States
has sided with the Muslims or the Arabs. He cites United States’ support for Afghanistan
against the Soviet Union, the United States support for Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo

29

Rubin, “The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism,” 1.
Fouad Ajami, “The Falseness of Anti-Americanism,” Foreign Policy, no. 138 (September-October,
2003), 60-1.
31
Bernard Lewis, “What Went Wrong,” The Atlantic Monthly (January, 2002) 2-3.
30

10

against Serbia, and the United States support for Turkey against Greece as cases in
point. 32

Differences of Culture, Values, or Religion
Some scholars argue that it is American culture or values that make the Middle
East incompatible with the United States. Walt contends that “as the world’s dominant
economic and military power, the United States casts a large cultural shadow.” 33 This
culture and value system is not universally accepted and can be a source of antiAmericanism, especially in the Middle East. Some religious fundamentalists condemn
American culture because of divorce rates, sexuality, and parenting out of wedlock.
Others reject American culture because of materialism, individualism, violence, or
democratic values. 34 Some worry that American culture is “too attractive,” and that once
exposed to this way of life, their citizens will embrace this percieved immorality.
Fareed Zakaria argues that the answer for what causes anti-Americanism is
simply religion. He contends that Islamic fundamentalism and extremism are solely
responsible for spreading hatred of the United States in the Middle East. 35 Zakaria urges
that Osama bin Laden and his followers, “come out of a culture that reinforces their
hostility, distrust, and hatred of the West—and of America in particular. This culture does
not condone terrorism but fuels the fanaticism that is at its heart.” 36 Zakaria further
argues that Islamic fundamentalism in society is what allows anti-Americanism to thrive.
Groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbullah, and Hamas have embedded
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themselves in this society, providing social services, temporary housing, and medical
assistance. These fundamentalists groups routinely preach anti-Americanism and are
dominant civil society actors in Middle Eastern countries. 37 Others argue that it is the
lack of secularism and separation of church and state that makes Middle Eastern society
incompatible with the United States. Lewis writes, “The struggle of the fundamentalists is
against two enemies, secularism and modernism.” 38 Lewis insists that the differences
between the Middle East and the United States is a “clash of civilizations” that cannot be
reconciled. Like Lewis, Samuel P. Huntington argues that the most important cause of
disagreement between these civilizations is religion. Huntington writes that the
differences in religion are “far more fundamental than differences among political
ideologies and political regimes.” 39 Huntington further contends that the Middle East will
be a “fault line” where increased conflict will occur between Western civilization and
Islamic civilization. He states, “In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy
strengthens anti-Western political forces. This may be a passing phenomenon, but it
surely complicates relations between Islamic countries and the West.” 40

1.5 The “Our Fault” Argument
Some scholars blame the spread of anti-Americanism in the Middle East on “what
we do.” Those that make this claim, argue that it’s not about the United States’ values,
culture or religion, but instead how the United States uses its power that causes antiAmericanism. John L. Esposito writes, “The widespread anti-Americanism among
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mainstream Muslims and Islamists results from what the United States does—its policies
and actions—not its way of life, culture, or religion.” 41 Tessler agrees and contends that
survey research has uncovered that anti-Americanism emerges from “a strong dislike for
American foreign policy” but has also uncovered “often quite positive, attitudes toward
American society and culture and toward the American people.” 42 These scholars claim
the United States’ policies are responsible for creating negative perceptions and that these
perceptions can be reversed if the United States adopts different policies. Esposito insists
that certain United States’ policies sustain the radical and extremists groups while at the
same time weakening the support for more moderate Islamists movements. 43 These
scholars urge that policies such as support for Israel, US hegemonic power, intervention
in domestic affairs, support of oppressive regimes, and have all contributed to antiAmerican sentiment in the Middle East.

Support for Israel
There are several scholars who claim the United States’ ongoing support for Israel
has significantly contributed to anti-American sentiment in the Middle East. Many insist
that this support began with the Israel’s creation in 1947 and has caused negative
perceptions of the United States ever since. 44 Andrew Kohut cites a 2003 Pew survey
which shows that “enormous majorities in Arab and Muslim countries (at least 90% in
Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Morocco, and Lebanon) believed the U.S. favors Israel
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too much.” 45 Also, in 2003, Telhami conducted a public survey in Arab countries such as
Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates in which
he asked questions regarding their overall perception of the United States. He states that
his results show the most negative perceptions toward the United States that he has ever
seen. “And at the heart of Arab attitudes,” Telhami observes, “are resentment of U.S.
policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.” 46
Scholars have specifically pointed out that the United States gives Israel
substantial economic and military aid, while also taking Israel’s side in the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Abdel Mahdi Abdallah writes, “The Arab perception of the American position is
that it is completely supportive of Israel, and that America always adopts Israel’s point of
view in this conflict.” 47 John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt claim that there is a proIsraeli interest group or lobby that actively shapes the United States’ foreign policy
toward Israel through lobbying in Congress and the Media. This lobby works to ensure
that “public discourse about Israel is favorable” and that United States foreign policy in
the Middle East reflects this. 48 Mearsheimer and Walt contend that the Israel lobby
affects United States’ Middle Eastern foreign policy in a fundamentally negative way.
Mearsheimer and Walt write, “We believe the activities of the groups and individuals
who make up the lobby are the main reason why the United States pursues policies in the
Middle East that make little sense on either strategic or moral grounds.” 49 They
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acknowledge that the United States’ support for Israel is causing severe anti-American
sentiment throughout the Middle East. 50 Lynch also contends that the United States
relationship with Israel is a factor in anti-Americanism. He asserts that based on the
survey evidence, “U.S. policies toward Israel bleed into wider attitudes toward the United
States.” 51 Lynch also claims that this relationship has continued for so long that many in
the Arab world are beginning to “equate the United States with Israel.” 52

Intervention in Domestic Affairs
Some scholars claim the overwhelming cause of anti-Americanism in the Middle
East is the United States’ intervention in the domestic affairs of Middle Eastern countries.
This intervention can come in the way of military occupation 53, air strikes or sanctions 54,
and the presence of military bases in Middle Eastern countries. 55 Robert Pape argues that
foreign military occupation is the definitive cause of anti-Americanism and also a very
significant factor in suicide terrorism with the Middle East. Pape claims that his research
shows that “more than 95 percent of all suicide attacks are in response to foreign
occupation.” 56 He also insists that over 90 percent of international suicide terrorism is
anti-American and a direct result of local regions being threatened by foreign troops. 57
Esposito contends that the primary driver for radicalism is the threat of political
domination and occupation by the West. He taps into this by asking questions in his
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survey such as “What can the West do to improve relations with the Muslim world?” and
“What is the most important thing the United States could do to improve the quality of
life of people like you in this country?” He finds that, “Their responses include: stop
interfering, meddling in our internal affairs, colonizing, and controlling natural
resources.” 58 Esposito argues that policy decisions such as the United States decision to
militarily occupy Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War of 1990-1991 directly led to “Osama
bin Laden’s transformation of al-Qaeda from a support group in the Afghan-Soviet war
into a global militant network.” 59
Abdallah insists that actions such as air strikes and sanctions increase antiAmericanism sentiment, because they are perceived as hostile and can often kill or affect
innocent civilians. Abdallah argues that the United States’ led air strikes on Libya, Sudan,
and Iraq throughout the 1990s led to a surge of anti-American perceptions throughout the
Middle East. 60 Abdallah also highlights that United States military bases in Saudi Arabia,
Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain are perceived as colonialist by many
throughout the Middle East. 61

Support for Oppressive Regimes
Abdallah argues that anti-Americanism also increases in the Middle East when
the civilian population associates the United States with their oppressive rulers. Abdallah
writes, “Another source of anti-Americanism has been America’s support for some
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authoritarian Arab regimes that are unpopular with their own people.” 62 The United
States often supports these authoritarian regimes with economic and military aid, and this
aid rarely ever trickles down to the civilians in the form of economic development.
Abdallah claims that the United States continues to support these oppressive regimes
because U.S. policy makers believe that they are a better alternative to an Islamist
government. 63
Some have argued that anti-Americanism emerges because they hate our
freedoms, our democracy, and our way of life. 64 However, the literature on democracy
promotion actually shows that the majority of the people in the Middle East favor
democracy but have resentment for the United States’ double standard in promoting
democracy. Thomas Carothers insists that it is not necessarily democracy promotion that
has caused backlash in the Middle East, but it is the fact that the United States still
supports autocratic regimes throughout the region. 65 Esposito called it “democratic
exceptionalism”, or the policy of “supporting authoritarian regimes in the Arab and
Muslim world while not promoting democracy there as it did elsewhere after the fall of
the Soviet Union.” 66 Esposito argues that the United States pursued its own interests such
as accessing oil and containing the Soviet Union instead of promoting democracy.
“While the spread of democracy has been the stated goal of the United States,” Esposito
writes, “majorities in every nation surveyed by Gallup do not believe that the United
States was serious about the establishment of democratic systems in the region.” 67
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Abdallah insists that the United States has been very hypocritical regarding the promotion
of democracy in the Middle East. “Democracy is undermined by the American support
for some Arab repressive regimes.” Abdallah writes, “Furthermore, the U.S. government
never pressed Arab regimes to become democratic nor to respect human rights.” 68
Much of the literature actually shows favorable opinions of democracy in the
Middle East. Kohut cites a Pew Global Attitude Survey in 2002, which resulted with
“overwhelming majorities of Jordanians, Lebanese, and Moroccans say democracy is not
just a western way of governance, and that it can work in their countries.” 69 Many in the
region especially favor aspects of democracy such as multiparty elections, freedom of
speech, and an independent media. Esposito finds similar results with his 2007 Gallup
survey, and he writes, “A significantly higher percentage of the politically radicalized say
that ‘moving toward greater government democracy’ will foster progress in the
Arab/Muslim world.” 70 Esposito shows that it is not democracy that is hated but it is the
way in which the United States uses democracy as an excuse to intervene in domestic
affairs. He quotes an Egyptian as saying, “Look at what America is doing in Iraq.
America is using democracy as a mask to colonize Muslim lands and to steal our oil.” 71
Some scholars claim that it could be a combination of the two arguments or that
the solution may lie outside this debate. Walt argues that anti-Americanism in the Middle
East is both “their fault” and “our fault”. He claims that some in the region do see our
culture and values as a problem, but that our foreign policy has also had negative
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consequences. 72 Lynch contends that neither argument is fully satisfying. He writes, “If
policies have nothing to do with anti-Americanism, then why did such sentiments spike
in 2002…If U.S. policies alone explain anti-Americanism, then how do we explain its
persistence across different administrations with what appear to be very different
policies.” 73 Shannon argues that when asking the “why do they hate us?” question, we
must not homogenize the “they”. He insists that there are distinctions between the
militant Islamists and those who are “merely Muslim.” 74 “Understanding these different
audiences,” Shannon writes, “we can grasp how the merely Muslim view the United
States in the first place and how they vary from militants in policy and values as a basis
for viewing the United States and its actions.” 75 Shannon encourages policy makers to
take both audiences into account when forming United States foreign policy in order to
minimize the amount of merely Muslim who transition into militants.

Analysis of the Literature
The literature on anti-Americanism in the Middle East is largely centered on two
main arguments; the “their fault” argument and the “our fault” argument. The literature
on both of these arguments has several strengths and weaknesses. In the following I will
compare and contrast the two arguments, discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the
literature, and determine how I will fill the gap and contribute to the current literature.
The “their fault” argument has several strengths. This argument has a good
amount of literature supporting it and many scholars have made this argument. This
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argument also appeals to many in the United States because it is easier to believe that
anti-Americanism emerged out of cultural and religious differences than out of mistakes
that the United States has made. The “their fault” argument is much easier to accept for
those that believe the United States is a fair and just force in the world. This argument
was especially popular directly after the September 11 attacks when many were trying to
understand “why they hate us.” The Bush Administration also reinforced this argument
directly after the September 11 attacks to explain why they occurred, which gave it more
credibility. Walt quotes President Bush as saying, “America was targeted for attack
because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world…The
terrorists who attacked our country on September 11, 2001 were not protesting our
policies. They were protesting our existence.” 76
However, the “their fault” argument also has several weaknesses. Much of the
literature on this argument was written during the 1990s and directly after September 11,
2001, which makes the argument somewhat outdated. This makes the argument lose
some of its credibility because much of the current literature is focused on the “our fault”
argument. This argument also seems to focus on the leaders of the Middle Eastern
countries rather than the civilian population. This additionally strikes a blow to this
argument because the leader of a country, who blames the United States for something,
doesn’t mean the civilian public will always full heartedly agree. In other words, this
means that anti-Americanism may not even come out of arguments such as “the blame
game.” Another large problem with this literature is that it fails to give a remedy to the
problem. Most of the “their fault” scholars argue that it’s out of the United States’ hands
and that there is nothing we can do about this form of anti-Americanism.
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The “our fault” argument has several strengths. Most importantly, this argument
is very current because most of the literature on this argument has emerged post
September 11, 2001. It appears that the trends of the literature seemed to sway in favor of
the “our fault” literature after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. It may have been that many
saw the United States’ policies at this time as causing anti-Americanism which led them
to agree with the “our fault” argument. This argument is also reinforced by many
different surveys that have been performed in the Middle East. Much of the scholars that
make this argument cite the Pew Research Center and Gallup surveys that show that the
average Middle Eastern citizens overwhelmingly blame United States’ policies. This
gives the “our fault” argument a great deal of validity and credibility. Another strength of
the “our fault” literature is that it does present the United States with an answer as to how
to prevent anti-Americanism in the future. Most of the “our fault” scholars argue that this
rapid increase in anti-Americanism can be reversed if the United States changes its
policies in the region.
The “our fault” argument does have several weakness as well. The scholars that
make this argument focus solely on negative policies the United States has made. Very
rarely do any of them discuss any of the positive policies that have been enacted by the
United States in the Middle East. A benefit to this argument would be to compare the
recent policy changes enacted by the Obama Administration in order to observe if there is
a change at all in anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Another weakness with this
argument is that these scholars rarely examine one overwhelming policy that leads to
anti-Americanism. This would be beneficial when giving policy advice to United States’
policy makers.
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In conclusion, the literature on anti-Americanism in the Middle East is not yet
complete. “Our fault” scholars could try to point out the United States’ foreign policy in
the Middle East that causes the largest amount of blow back. Does United States
intervention in domestic affairs cause more anti-Americanism than the United States
support for Israel? “Their fault” scholars could attempt to update their research more and
find statistical or survey results that provide more evidence for their claims.
More specifically, scholars could use a time series design to look at certain time
periods while introducing variables such as “the United States’ support for Israel” or “the
United States’ support for oppressive regimes.” This would allow the researcher to
analyze the affects of the introduced variable on anti-Americanism. This approach could
be taken on an extended time period with a section on each variable to compare the
results of each. This could potentially allow scholars to isolate one variable over another
as a catalyst for anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Scholars could also isolate certain
events and analyze the impact of the event such as the 2003 Iraq War, or the 2011
military intervention in Libya. These methodological approaches would help to fill a
large gap in the current literature, which is far from complete.

1.6 Case Selection
Throughout this study, public perceptions are analyzed in six Middle Eastern
states. I examine the yearly public perception in (1) Egypt, (2) Jordan, (3) Lebanon, (4)
Morocco, (5) Saudi Arabia, and (6) Turkey. I also use the mean of the six countries in
order to establish a regional perception of the United States. These six states were chosen
carefully based on the available survey data and representativeness of the Middle East.
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These states represent a variety of ethnic groups including but not limited to: Arabs,
Turks, Kurds, Berbers, and Armenians. These states also represent a variety of religious
groups including but not limited to: Islam (Sunnis, Shi’ahs, Sufis, and Druze),
Christianity (Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Coptic, and Protestant), and Judaism. These six
states also represent different regions of the Middle East. The Maghreb region in North
Africa is represented by Morocco. The Levant region is represented by Lebanon, Jordan,
and Egypt. The Arabian Peninsula region is represented by Saudi Arabia. Finally, the
Anatolia region is represented by Turkey.

1.7 Variables and Operationalization
What causes the increase in anti-Americanism within the Middle East? The
dependent variable is the public perception of the United States in the Middle East; the
independent variables are (1) the United States support for oppressive regimes in the
Middle East, (2) the United States support for Israel, and (3) the United States’ foreign
interference in domestic affairs within the Middle East.

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable, the public perception of the United States in the Middle
East, will also be referred to as the concept of anti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism will
be defined as opposition to or animosity toward the people, government, and/or policies
of the United States. 77 Levels of anti-Americanism will be measured by survey analysis
of dozens of surveys preformed by the Pew Research Center, Gallup, Zogby
International, World Public Opinion, Terror Free Tomorrow, the Arab Barometer, and the
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World Values Survey. 78 The levels of anti-Americanism will be measured by country and
level of favorability. The year by year results will be compiled together and given one
number out of 100. For example, lower numbers account for a low favorability of the
United States, while higher numbers account for a higher favorability of the United
States.

Independent Variables
There are three independent variables that will be analyzed that may impact the
levels of negative public perception of the United States in the Middle East. The first
independent variable that I take into account is the United States support for oppressive
regimes in the Middle East. To measure this variable, I analyze Freedom House
indicators to determine which Middle Eastern regimes are not free and/or oppressive. 79 I
then apply three operational indicators to the totalitarian, authoritarian, or non-democratic
governments in the Middle East: (1) the amount Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to the
country in question from the United States; (2) the economic aid given to the country in
question by the United States in the form of Economic Support Funds (ESF), (3) the
amount of international trade, in the form of imports and exports between the country in
question and the United States.
78
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The second variable is the United States support for Israel. This variable is
measured using four operational indicators: (1) the number of United Nations vetoes by
the United States of Security Council resolutions that were critical of Israel, (2) the
amount of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Israel from the United States, and (3) the
economic aid given to Israel by the United States in the form of Economic Support Funds
(ESF). 80 The last operational indicator is (4) foreign trade between the United States and
Israel in the form of imports and exports.
The third variable is the United States’ foreign interference in domestic affairs.
This is the act of violating a country’s sovereignty through diplomatic or military means.
This variable will be measured by six operational indicators: (1) the number of economic
sanctions put forth through the United Nations on country in question by the United
States, (2) the presence of military bombing on country in question by the United States
or forces including the United States, (3) the installment of a no-fly zone, (4) the presence
of/or number of ground troops deployed within the country in question by the United
States or forces including the United States, (5) the number of civilian casualties caused
by the United States within country in question, and (6) the use of United States’ predator
drones in country in question.
These three variables are measured on a yearly basis for the years that are
specified in the methods section. They will not only be applied to the six states being
studied but also to the other states within the Middle Eastern region. This is important
because the variable taking place could have effects on the surrounding country, not just
the country it is occurring in. For this study the Middle East will include the following
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countries: Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, the Palestine territory, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman,
the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Turkey, Iraq, Iran,
Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco.

Table 1.1:
Independent Variables

Operationalization of Independent
Variables

1. United States’ Support for Oppressive
Regimes

Foreign Military Sales, Economic
Support Funds, Foreign Trade (Imports
and Exports)

2. United States’ Support for Israel

US vetoes of United Nations Security
Council Resolutions critical of Israel,
Foreign Military Sales, Economic
Support Funds, Foreign Trade (Imports
and Exports),
Economic Sanctions, Military
Bombing, No Fly Zone, Ground
Troops, Casualties, Predator Drones

3. United States’ Intervention in Domestic
Affairs

1.8 Research Design
Using the cases of Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Morocco
this study will adopt a quasi-experimental time series design to uncover the main causal
mechanism of public perceptions of the United States in the Middle East. Because of the
inability to control for some of my independent variables as well as outside variables a
true experiment becomes impossible. Therefore, the quasi-experimental design was the
best approach to my research. I perform a time series experiment testing the public
perceptions of the United States in the six states that were chosen. Marcus E. Ethridge
writes, “Such designs involve a series of observations both prior to and following the
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introduction of the independent variable.” 81 Therefore, I examine public perceptions of
the United States on a yearly basis and compare shifts in public opinion with the
introduction of different foreign policy actions by the United States. Social scientist, Paul
E. Spector states, “The purpose of the investigation is to determine whether the variables
of interest changed at a specific point in the series.” 82 This study used statistical
correlation data to determine causality between my independent and dependent variables.
However, statistical analysis is not flawless and does not paint the entire picture.
Therefore, I also compound the statistical analysis with qualitative analysis in each
chapter. My study focuses on the public perceptions of the six Middle Eastern states over
a ten year time span from 2002 to 2011. Using statistical and qualitative analysis, I
determine if there is a causal relationship between the United States foreign policy
decision making and increased negative public perceptions of the United States.

Hypotheses
Using the three independent variables I have developed three separate hypotheses:

(H1) The United States’ support for oppressive regimes within the Middle East
has led to an increase of negative public perceptions of the United States in the Middle
East.
(H2) The United States’ support for Israel caused an increase in negative public
perceptions of the United States in the Middle East.
(H3) The United States’ foreign interference in domestic affairs within the Middle
East has led to an increase of negative public perceptions of the United States in the
Middle East.
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(Null) The United States’ foreign policy does not have a correlation with public
perceptions of the United States.

This study consists of three separate chapters addressing the three foreign policies
drawn from the literature as causing the largest increases in anti-Americanism. Chapter
two analyzes the public opinion polling data on a regional level and country by country
for my selected cases. I then analyze the United States’ support for oppressive regimes in
the Middle East. I must first determine which regimes are oppressive for each year of the
study. After this, the operational indicators such as military support, economic support,
and trade relationships will be analyzed and correlation tested with the public perceptions
of the six Middle Eastern states. This chapter isolates the case of Lebanon as an example
of transition from oppressive regime to partly free regime and compares US support for
Lebanon prior to and after this shift. I also analyze possible changes in United States’
foreign policy of supporting oppressive regimes and determine – via qualitative analysis
if it had an effect on public perceptions.
Chapter three analyzes the United States’ support for Israel and its affect on the
public perceptions of the United States in the Middle East. I analyze a historical
assessment of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the historical relationship between the United
States and Israel. I then measure US support for Israel from 2002 to 2011 by measuring
the United States’ United Nations votes in favor of Israel, trade relationship, economic
support, and military support. Correlation testing is then enacted to uncover any causal
relationship between US support for Israel and levels of anti-Americanism in the Middle
East. I also analyze diplomatic statements from the ten year period and debate if US
foreign policy toward Israel has recently changed.
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In chapter four I focus on the United States’ intervention in domestic affairs and
use of military force. Similarly to Chapter’s two and three, I discuss the history of US
intervention in the Middle East. I then analyze and measure US interference from 2002
until 2011, and test correlations between US intervention and the public opinion polling
data. Finally, I discuss US intervention in 2011, and whether or not there is such a thing
as “legitimate intervention.”
In conclusion, this type of design is not flawless because I cannot say with 100%
accuracy that there were no outside spurious variables. Spector writes, “The major
problem is lack of control for history. One can never be certain that some event other
than the treatment in question caused the change in dependent variable. The advantage of
the time series is that one can see the direction in which trends were heading at the time
of intervention or treatment” 83 However, I will not ignore the history of the United States
foreign policy in the Middle East. As the literature has pointed out, the history is an
important aspect of anti-Americanism in the Middle East, and it does affect the lens that
current events are viewed through. The use of statistical along with qualitative analysis is
essential because it allows the researcher to uncover any causal relationships between the
dependent variable and independent variables. I expected to observe a rise in antiAmerican sentiment during the introduction of variables (1), (2), and (3) throughout the
time period of 2002 through 2011 with the largest increase coming with the introduction
of variable (3) the United States’ intervention in domestic affairs in 2003. For the most
part this expectation was accurate, and the largest increase in anti-American sentiment
came in 2003 following the US invasion of Iraq. However, I did not expect to find the
correlation between the United States’ support prior to and after Lebanon’s democratic
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transition and level of favorability of the United States in Lebanon. The United States
was rewarded for supporting the democratic transition with a significant boost in public
opinion of the US. Prior to my research, I also expected to see an increase in positive
public perceptions of the United States after 2008 and during the Obama Administration.
However, although approval did increase in 2009, this was not the case in 2011 as half of
the cases witnessed lower approvals than in the final year of the Bush Administration in
2008. In the following Chapter I analyze US support for oppressive regimes and
determine its impact on public perception of US in the Middle East.
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2. Democracy or Hypocrisy?: The United States’ Support for Oppressive Regimes
“[A]pproval of terrorist attacks against U.S. targets is not driven by religious
orientations, judgments about Western culture, or economic circumstances, but by anger
toward the United States as an agent that sustains support for unpopular governments.”
-Steven Kull 84
2.1 Introduction
The political uprisings during the Arab Spring unraveled authoritarian regimes
such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen, and continue to cause turmoil in countries
such as Syria. These events finally led to the United States ending some of its support for
authoritarian governments. But did United States’ support for democracy come too little
too late? Should the United States have reconsidered this policy of backing oppressive
regimes long before the Arab uprisings? How has this support affected the public
attitudes and perceptions of the United States in the Middle East? This chapter analyzes
Middle Eastern public opinion between 2002 and 2011 while measuring support of
oppressive regimes by the United States. Hypothesis 1 contends that United States’
support for oppressive regimes within the Middle East increases negative public
perceptions of the United States in the Middle East. If this is accurate, levels of antiAmericanism should increase along with increased support for oppressive regimes by the
United States. The inverse of this relationship must always be analyzed. If the United
States ends support for an oppressive regime and increases support for democracy, antiAmericanism should decrease. This chapter traces the United States’ support for
oppressive regimes, measures which regimes were oppressive between 2002 and 2011,
analyzes Middle Eastern public opinion for the aforementioned years, and identifies any
correlation between levels of support and increases in anti-Americanism. I then examine
84
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US policy toward Lebanon before and after the Cedar Revolution to determine if US
support for democracy decreases anti-Americanism. To conclude this chapter, I give an
analysis of possible policy shifts during the Arab Spring of 2011 and shed light on
whether or not these shifts have affected levels of anti-Americanism.

2.2 History of United States’ Support for Oppressive Regimes
Since World War II, the United States has made a habit of supporting autocratic
regimes throughout the Middle East. At times this was seen as an effective Cold War
strategy of containing Soviet influence in the region or to ensure the supply of oil. 85
These decisions were not questioned at the time by United States’ political leaders and
were seen as necessary for the strategic interests of the United States. But, was the United
States on the “wrong side of history?” Many in the Middle East have not forgotten this
support for authoritarian leaders and thus question the United States’ commitment to
democracy and freedom in the Middle East. Many in the Middle East accused the United
States of enacting a policy of hypocrisy and double standard as the United States claimed
to support democracy but continued to back autocratic governments. 86 I address this
dilemma by first reviewing the history behind the United States’ support for oppressive
regimes.
States such as Algeria and Tunisia were historical oppressive and did maintain
relatively friendly historical relations with the United States, but did not receive an
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excessive amount of US economic or military support. 87 The United States also did not
support every oppressive regime within the Middle East. States such as Syria, Libya, and
South Yemen were often at odds with the United States. Each of these states was placed
on the State Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism list at its creation on December
29, 1979, 88 and each state had received extremely low amounts of support from the
United States. 89 States such as Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Turkey, and North Yemen were
all considered partly free by Freedom House when it published its first “Freedom in the
World” 90 report in 1972. All of these countries with the exception of the now united
Republic of Yemen, currently remain partly free, and therefore will not be analyzed
historically.
Saudi Arabia was among the first Middle Eastern states to be seen as strategically
important because of their richness in oil. Before supporting Saudi Arabia, the United
States was not politically involved in the Middle East. This began a trend in the Middle
East and especially the Arabian Peninsula of propping up authoritarian regimes as long as
the regime supported these pro-US oil policies. 91 Middle Eastern regimes later became
integral to the West because of their strategic importance within the Cold War context.
The United States enacted the policy of “oil denial” to ensure that the Soviet Union could
not control oil resources in the Middle East. 92
The United States’ interest in Saudi Arabian oil dates back to World War I. Prior
to this time period, the United States was confident that its own reserves were sufficient
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for its demand in oil. However, World War I changed this view. David Long writes, “As
the allies became cut off from their own foreign sources of oil during the war, however,
and the United States became the main supplier of oil for the Allied war effort, official
U.S. interest in overseas supplies increased. 93” This compelled many officials in the
United States to begin looking for oil in the Middle East. By 1928, seven American oil
companies created a joint venture which was known as the Near East Development
Corporation. This corporation, along with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Gulf Oil
Corporation, and Royal Dutch Shell made an agreement which would determine the
course of all international oil transactions. Throughout the 1930s, the United States
began to expand its interest in Middle Eastern oil to Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.
This newly formed partnership between Saudi Arabia and the United States was
synergetic. Both countries were suffering from the global depression, and this brought a
new and flourishing business to King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud. By 1944 a Californian oil
company (Socal) and Texas oil company (Texaco) merged and changed their name to the
Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). Khalidi writes, “Oil produced by
ARAMCO was crucial to the postwar recovery of Europe, to keeping oil prices extremely
low for several decades after World War II, and to increasing the profits of the big
American oil companies that dominated the world oil market. 94”
The United States government began to oversee some of the operations of
ARAMCO. They promoted Aramco’s 50-50 profit sharing agreement with Saudi Arabia
in 1950 and assisted with the selling of equity shares from Aramco to New Jersey
company Exxon and New York company Mobil. Long writes, “From the U.S.
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government point of view, the sale facilitated the continued orderly international oil
market process and reinforced U.S. oil security through continued U.S. control of
overseas sources. 95” The United States also recognized the strategic advantage that Saudi
Arabia offered, and established a major air base at Dhahran during World War II. Khalidi
writes, “by keeping American troops and oil workers strictly segregated from his
xenophobic subjects, Ibn Sa’ud and his successors were able to offer the United States
advantages unavailable elsewhere to its great power rivals. 96” Khalidi and Bronson also
highlight that Ibn Saud was a strong anti-communist and strategic ally in the Cold War. 97
Saudi Arabia spent billions of dollars around the world to combat communism and the
religiosity of the country helped to ensure that other Arab countries remained antiCommunist as well. Ibn Saud also did not have to deal with the “Arab Cold War” 98 in
the way Iraq, Syria, and Egypt had to confront it. 99 Therefore, this relationship was even
more appealing to the United States.
The creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in
1960 began to curb the United State immense influence over Saudi oil. 100 The United
States was no longer able to control international oil prices. The Arab oil embargo of
1973 assured that prices would now be set by the oil producers which increased revenues
for oil producing countries. However, these developments did not affect the relationship
between the Saudi regime and the United States. Khalidi writes, “The American oil
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companies continued to enjoy a privileged position in their relations with the Saudi oil
industry, while the United States continued to enjoy its strategic privileges in the country,
such as rights to military bases. 101” The United States also supplied Saudi Arabia with
consumer goods, construction, and military weapons capabilities which were overseen by
American companies. 102
The United States has also chosen to ignore the Saudi regime’s domestic policies.
Saudi Arabia follows an extremely strict and fundamentalist version of Islam called
Wahhabism. The Quran and the Sunna are Saudi Arabia’s constitution, and there is no
freedom of religion. 103 Women have relatively few social, civil, or political rights.
Women are prohibited from driving or leaving the house on their own. Men are also
favored on matters of divorce, inheritance, and child custody. There are few laws in
Saudi Arabia against gender violence, domestic violence, or marital rape. Saudi Arabia is
a traditional monarchy with no elections or political parties. The constitution does not
guarantee any right to free speech, freedom of press, or right to assembly. Although the
United States has constantly claimed that its goal in the Middle East is to spread
democracy, it has continued to support the Saudi regime. 104
Similar to Saudi Arabia, the fundamental pillar of the United States relationship
with Iran was oil. After World War II, the Soviet Union had a presence in Iran, which the
United States feared would spread to other Persian Gulf states. The United States
believed a pro-US regime in Iran was essential to preventing Soviet encroachment.
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Rashid Khalidi contends that this popping up a pro-US regime in Iran was “designed to
ensure lasting foreign control of this extremely valuable commodity.” 105
Reza Shah became the ruler of Iran in 1925 and the Anglo Persian Oil Company
was created to oversee and manage Iran’s oil supplies. During World War II, the allies
ousted Reza Shah because of his pro-German sentiments, and installed his son,
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, as ruler of Iran. After World War II, the United States began
to develop a close relationship with Iran and Mohammad Reza Shah. However, in 1951
the newly elected and extremely popular Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadeq,
nationalized the renamed Anglo Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Mark Gasiorowski states,
“He [Mossadeq] ended a long period of British hegemony in Iran by nationalizing the
British controlled oil industry, instilling a strong sense of national pride in most Iranians,
and setting the stage for several decades of economic growth fueled by oil revenues.” 106
However, Britain and the United States were extremely concerned about this new popular
leader. Khalidi writes, “In August 1953, the Iranian military, which had been advised by
American officers since World War II, carried out a coup inspired and organized by the
British MI6 and the CIA.” 107 (The coup will be discussed in further detail in Chapter
Four)
The Shah’s new government then returned the AIOC to its former state of being
overseen by Western oil companies. The only difference was that now the American oil
companies owned a forty percent share of the AIOC which was renamed British
Petroleum (BP). The United States continued to support the Shah’s regime while ignoring
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the brutal and oppressive policies he unleashed on Iranian citizens. “The United States
thereafter strongly backed the Shah,” writes Gasiorowski, “greatly facilitating his efforts
to create an authoritarian regime in the decade after the coup.” 108 Hahn agrees when he
writes, “In the aftermath of the coup, Eisenhower quickly bolstered the Shah, who
became a staunch ally of the United States.” 109 The United States further extended over
one billion US dollars in economic and military aid to the Shah’s regime by 1960. 110
Hahn argues that hundreds of U.S. military personnel trained Iran’s national police forces
and army with the Shah even granting these U.S. soldiers diplomatic immunity from
Iranian law. 111
After the coup, the Shah took power with much stricter and more oppressive
control than he had before. He immediately looked to crush the dissident groups to ensure
that no one would threaten his reign again. To do this the CIA helped the Shah create a
secret police force called the Sāzemān-e Ettelā'āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar (SAVAK). The
SAVAK was completely funded and trained by the CIA with the sole purpose of ensuring
the Shah maintained his regime. “The notorious Iranian secret police,” Blum writes,
“spread its tentacles all over the world to punish Iranian dissidents. According to a former
CIA analyst on Iran, SAVAK was instructed in torture techniques by the agency.” 112 The
Shah routinely used SAVAK to repress any opposition movements using illicit detention
and torture. The Shah also banned all political parties and constantly used censorship
against opposition groups. 113
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Many suspected communists or political dissidents were snatched up by the
SAVAK and never seen again. “With virtually unlimited powers to arrest and interrogate,
SAVAK has tortured and murdered thousands of the Shah's opponents.” 114 The Shah also
allowed Iran to be used as a United States base against the Soviet Union, and was
reimbursed with vast amounts of money and weapons from the United States. Blum
writes, “The Shah literally placed his country at the disposal of US military and
intelligence organizations to be used as a cold war weapon, a window and a door to the
Soviet Union.” 115 The Nixon and Carter Administrations both continued their
unquestioned support for the Shah. Hahn asserts, “For security and economic reasons,
Nixon nurtured a close relationship with the Shah and offered to sell him any nonnuclear
weapon systems the Shah desired.” 116
The Shah grew more unpopular the worse he treated the Iranian people and the
closer he got to the United States. The Shah did attempt to reform his rule by enacting a
series of social and economic reforms known as the “White Revolution.” 117 These
consisted of housing, land, and health care reforms to help the lower class, and issued
more rights to women including the right to vote. As the situation in Iran continued to
deteriorate in the late 1970s, the Carter Administration also pushed the Shah to end his
human rights abuses. However, it was too little too late as the Shah was overthrown from
power during the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79. 118
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The United States has also maintained a close relationship with many of the oil
producing countries in the Gulf region. States such as Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the
United Arab Emirates were recognized following Britain’s exit from the region by 1971.
Sean Foley writes, “Four new states – Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab
Emirates – were recognized and…with small populations and enormous oil wealth, these
new states would naturally become key international players, just like the already
independent Arab Gulf states of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.” 119 These states experienced
close ties with the United States because of their abundance in oil and Cold War
positioning by the United States. Foley asserts, “In 1970, US oil companies controlled 55
percent of the region’s oil industry and had $1.5 billion in assets in the Gulf.” 120 These
states also have similarities with Saudi Arabia and Iran in that upon independence they
became authoritarian. Eva Bellin argues that this “robustness in authoritarianism” is a
direct result of the United States willingness to support these regimes during and after the
Cold War. 121 These states have had relatively no freedom of speech or expression, no
freedom of the press, and very poor rights for women. 122 Gregory Gause claims these “oil
monarchies” have access to enormous amounts of wealth due to oil revenues which
enables them to expand the state apparatus and control their populations. He also argues
that these countries routinely use state bureaucracy, secret police, and the military to
control all aspects of civil society. 123 Gause further criticizes the United States as
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hypocritical because of the lack of democracy promotion in the Gulf region, especially
after the fall of the Soviet Union. He claims that the United States ignores the many
human rights violations and continues to support the authoritarian governments because it
allows for political stability and a continuation of the status quo. 124
The United States’ historical relationship with Egypt is quite different than from
that of Saudi Arabia, Iran under the Shah, or the Arab Gulf states. During the rule of
Egyptian President, Gemal Abdel Nasser, Egypt was governed by Arab nationalistic
principles which were usually at odds with the United States. Egypt was also sympathetic
toward the Soviet Union and found itself opposed to the United States during the Cold
War divide. Egypt was a sworn enemy of Israel whom the United States supported since
its birth in 1948. Egypt went to war with Israel in 1948, 1967, and 1973, while the United
States was often on the opposing side of this conflict. 125
However, this all changed in 1979 when the United States was able to broker a
peace deal between Egypt and Israel at Camp David. Part of the peace deal was that
Egypt would receive the second largest amount of US foreign aid, behind Israel. William
Quandt writes, “Aid to Egypt is widely seen as an integral part of Egyptian-Israeli peace,
which is strongly supported by Congress and the American public.” 126 The United States
continues to supply Egypt with large amounts of economic and military aid.
Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak took power in 1981 following President
Anwar Sadat’s assassination, and ruled over Egypt until the Arab Spring of 2011.
Mubarak has controlled Egypt with his authoritarian regime, through which he routinely
violated his citizens’ civil and political rights including the electoral process, freedom of
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speech and expression, organizational rights, and individual rights. Mubarak used the
secret police and military courts to exact punishment on any dissidents which often
included detainment and torture. 127 In 2005, Mubarak reformed the constitution which
gave way for the country’s first multiparty elections. However, he responded to
parliamentary elections which favored his opposition by government crackdowns. This
process was repeated several times until Mubarak was forced to step down in 2011. 128
Iraq also has a vast amount of oil and has experienced a confusing history of
support and intervention by the United States. Iraq achieved its independence in 1921,
but its history mirrored Iran in that the British exerted their influence over the country.
Iraq’s first monarch, King Faisal I, was put in place by the British even though he had
never been to Iraq in his life. 129 After several coup attempts and interventions by the
British, the Iraqi “Free Officers” finally succeeded in killing the royal family and
separating themselves from the British in 1958. Fearing being cut-off from Iraqi oil and
seeing the communist threat, the United States’ CIA with assistance from Egyptian
intelligence conspired with the Iraqi Baathist party and organized a coup of Iraqi
president, Abdel Karim Qasim. 130 President Kennedy approved the coup in February of
1963, and Qasim was soon replaced by a Baathist government. (The coup will be
discussed in further detail in Chapter Four) Lando argues that the CIA also gave the new
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regime lists of communists within Iraq that were soon executed by Saddam Hussein and
other members of Baathist government. 131
Hussein became head of security, when General Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr took
power in 1968. Saddam then took power for himself when he ousted a weak and sick
Bakr in 1979. 132 The United States had initially been reluctant to support the Hussein
regime, but saw it as an effective counter-balance to the new threat posed by the Islamist
revolution in Iran. 133 In September of 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, and the Carter
Administration announced its neutrality even though it began to see the value in
supporting Iraq. As the war began to shift in Iran’s favor in 1982, the Reagan
Administration removed Iraq from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. It also shared
intelligence with Iraq, began military training of Iraqi soldiers, and allowed for arms from
the United States to be funneled to Iraq from Jordan and Kuwait. 134 Khalidi argures that
the United States supplied Iraq with information to make chemical weapons and dual-use
equipment for Iraq’s nuclear program. 135 The United States also attempted to halt Iran’s
progress in 1983 by stopping arms transfers and applying economic sanctions. This
support, which usually came in the form of military aid and supplies continued on and off
until the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. During this period of support for Iraq, the
United States ignored the extremely brutal tactics undertaken by Saddam Hussein,
especially against the Kurdish population in northern Iraq. 136 The Iraqi government also
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used chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds in the early 1980s, but the United
States continued its unofficial support. 137
This history shows that the United States has followed a pattern of supporting
regimes based not on democratic principles or human rights successes, but instead
because of oil resources and Cold War strategy. The United States government grew
fearful of Arab Nationalism which tended to be swayed by the Soviet Union, and instead
supported regimes in which they could trust would not turn to the Eastern Bloc. However,
the United States ignored human rights abuses and authoritarian control which began a
history of resentment toward the United States by the ordinary citizens in the Middle
East. Ussama Makdisi writes, “This anti-Americanism was not characterized by hatred of
America or things American as much as by a relatively new identification of American
power as a force for oppression rather than liberation in the Arab world.” 138 Khalidi
argues that this US policy was “based on studiously ignoring the human rights abuses
and/or the undemocratic systems of governments from which the United States stood to
benefit in one way or another.” 139 This history of US support for authoritarianism sets the
stage for US support from 2002 until 2011. This is not viewed as separate, but as a
continuation of a history of US support for authoritarian governments instead of
democracies. I now discuss which Middle Eastern regimes are currently oppressive and
then analyze the United States’ support for these regimes from 2002 through 2011.
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2.3 Which Middle Eastern Regimes are Oppressive from 2002-2011?
Using Freedom House indicators, I categorized each Middle East state as either
oppressive or non-oppressive for every year from 2002-2011. Freedom House assesses
political rights and civil liberties, rating countries on a 1 to 7 scale, with 1 being the most
free and 7 being the least free. Then the organization labels countries as free, partly free,
or not free. For the purpose of my study, the not free countries will be considered
oppressive regimes and the free and partly free countries will be considered as nonoppressive regimes. This was decided because there are not any Muslim countries in the
Middle East with a free rating. The only country in the Middle East rated as free is Israel.
However, there are countries in the Middle East such as Turkey and Morocco where
women have many more rights than elsewhere in the Middle East including the right to
participate in politics. 140 In Morocco, women have the right to participate in religious
study, and have been granted much more rights when it comes to inheritance, child
custody, and marriage. 141 Although these states, and others considered partly free still
have restrictions when it comes to freedom of the press and freedom of speech, I do not
consider them oppressive or autocratic regimes. The case of Iraq is classified differently
in 2003 and 2004 because the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) occupied the
country until it adopted a new constitution in 2005. 142 My results are shown below in
Table 1. Non-oppressive regimes are classified with an N and oppressive regimes are
classified with an O
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Table 2.1: Oppressive Regimes in the Middle East 2002-2011
2002
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Qatar
Saudia Arabia
Syria
Tunisia
Turkey
\ Yemen

O
O
O
O
O
N
N
O
O
N
O
O
O
O
O
N
O

2003
O
O
O
O
CPA
N
N
O
O
N
O
O
O
O
O
N
O

2004
O
O
O
O
CPA
N
N
O
O
N
O
O
O
O
O
N
O

2005
O
O
O
O
O
N
N
O
O
N
O
O
O
O
O
N
N

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
O
O
O
O
O
O
N
N
N
N
N
N
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
O
O
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2.4 Analysis of United States Support for Oppressive Regimes from 2002-2011
With each Middle Eastern country now coded from 2002-2011, I turn to
the analysis of levels of support by the United States for these regimes. To analyze
United States’ support for oppressive regimes I apply three operational indicators: (1) the
amount of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to the country in question from the United States
including equipment, services, and training; (2) the economic aid given to the country in
question by the United States in the form of Economic Support Funds (ESF); and (3) the
amount of international trade, in the form of exchanging or purchasing goods, services,
and/or capital, which are imported or exported between the country in question and the
United States. In addition to this quantitative analysis, I also do a qualitative analysis of
143
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press releases and diplomatic statements during the Arab Spring to determine any change
in US policy.

Table 2.2: Total Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Millions

Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Libya
Oman
Qatar
Saudia Arabia
Syria
Tunisia
U.A.E.
Yemen
Total

Total Foreign Military Sales in Millions
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
0.1
0.6
0.7
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.9
1
38.8
94.5
25.3
19.5
16.3
17.3
4.6
8.7
19.7
1,301.20 1,304.10 1,293.70 1,290.90 1,288.90 1,301.20 1,290.70 1,301.30 1,301.90
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1*
*
1,498.30 5,470.40
4,143
4,369
2,621
1,006
0.6
0.7
0.7
0.8 *
*
*
*
*
*
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.5
25.5
81.6
25.7
21
14.8
14.6
6.1
8.4
10.4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
6.4
13.1
12.3
10.3
10.3
10.1
14.5
20.3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20.5
2.9
20.8 *
*
*
*
*
13.7
1397.7
1490.8
1380
2843.7
6801.5
5487.2
5681.2
3954.8
2373.5
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Table 2 displays operational indicator (1) the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) given
to each oppressive regime in the Middle East. These numbers represent US dollars in
millions.145 These numbers were taken directly from the United States Overseas Loans
and Grants data which is compiled by the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) as a companion to the annual report issued to the United States
Congress. Numbers are not listed for year 2011 because those reports have not been
published yet. The stars on Lebanon and Yemen’s data represent years in which those
countries were not considered oppressive. The case of Lebanon is different from the other
cases because it begins as an oppressive regime and then transitions to a non-oppressive
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regime. Therefore, it allows the researcher to compare the United States’ support for
Lebanon during the oppressive years with the support for Lebanon during the nonoppressive years. This case can be used as a model for US policy makers and is discussed
further in the country by country analysis at the end of the chapter.
This data shows that Iraq was the largest recipient of United States military aid
during the ten year time period. Iraqi numbers for 2003 and 2004 were left out due to the
Coalition Provisional Authority occupying the country for those years. The next largest
recipient of FMS is Egypt which stays around $13 billion throughout the eight years of
available data. Bahrain and Oman receive a substantial amount of FMS in years 20022004 and then numbers begin to decline for the duration of years. FMS given to Yemen
declined in 2003 and after 2004 Yemen was no longer considered an oppressive regime.
Lebanon received an average of $.7 million until 2006 when it was no longer considered
an oppressive regime. Tunisia stays at an average of $10.7 million and Algeria hovers at
an average of $.6 million throughout the eight years of data. Iran, Libya, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates don’t receive any FMS for the eight year
time span. Overall, total FMS is steady through 2004; it then almost doubles in 2005 and
again in 2006. It remains steady through 2008 and then declines in 2009.
Table 3 displays operational indicator (2) the Economic Support Funds (ESF)
given to each oppressive regime in the Middle East. These numbers represent US dollars
in millions. These numbers were taken directly from the United States Overseas Loans
and Grants data which is compiled by the USAID as a companion to the annual report
issued to the United States Congress. Numbers are not listed for year 2011 because those

48

reports have not been published yet. See last page for stars on Lebanon and Yemen’s
data.

Table 2.3: Total Foreign Economic Aid (ESF) in Millions

Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Libya
Oman
Qatar
Saudia Arabia
Syria
Tunisia
U.A.E.
Yemen
Total

2002
4
0.1
901
0.3
0*
15.2
0
0.6
0
0
0.1
0.1
0.8
3.5
925.7

2003
3.1
0.1
412.2
1
*
66.7
0
0.1
0
0.1
0
0
0.2
38.9
522.4

Total Foreign Economic Aid in Millions
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
3.4
3.6
2.9
5.3
12
11.2
14.5
0
1.6
1.1
0.8
0.5
0.4
0.8
663.9
272.4
498.3
671.2
201
483.2
397
10.3
1.2
3.3
4.6
7.2
0.7
1.2
7,984.30 5,093.00
3,816 3,136.50 2,252.70 1,081.90
35.9
24.5 *
*
*
*
*
*
0
0.1
25.1
4.3
9.6
7.7
23.8
0.4
4.5
3.8
0.7
17.3
10.4
4.1
0
1.5
1.3
1.1
0.4
4
2.5
0.2
1.4
1.8
0.9
0.7
0.5
0.5
0
0.4
2.7
2.3
36.5
18.6
22.4
0
0.2
0.3
0.9
0.7
1.1
0.8
0.3
1.1
0.8
11
0.9
0.4
1.2
57.8 *
*
*
*
*
125.1
772.2
8296.8
5634.4
4519.5
3423.3
2790.9
1675.8
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Similarly to the FMS, Iraq is also the largest recipient of ESF during the eight year
time span. Iraqi numbers for 2003 and 2004 were left out due to the Coalition Provisional
Authority occupying the country. Egypt is also the second largest receiver of ESF during
this time period. Egypt hits a high point in 2002 with $901 million and a low point in
2008 with $201 million. Lebanon averages at 35.5 million until it is no longer considered
oppressive after 2005. Oman and Syria both receive their highest amount of ESF in 2008.
Algeria averages at 3.7 million US dollars from 2002-2007 and then this amount triples
during 2008-2009. Libya’s ESF spikes from .1 million in 2005 to 25.1 million in 2006
and the number drops back down for the remaining years. Iran’s ESF increases in 2004
and 2008 and the United Arab Emirates’ ESF increases substantially in 2007. Yemen
146
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receives its highest ESF of $58.3 million before it’s no longer considered oppressive in
2004. Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Qatar, and Bahrain all average at less than 1 million
throughout the time period with little fluctuation. Overall, total ESF is relatively low
through 2004; it then jumps remarkably high in 2005 at $8.3 Billion US dollars. ESF then
continues to decrease between 2005 and 2009 when it reaches its lowest point at $2.8
Billion US dollars.

Table 2.4a: Total International Trade Exports in Millions

Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Libya
Oman
Qatar
Saudia Arabia
Syria
Tunisia
U.A.E.
Yemen
Total

Total International Trade Exports in Millions
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
984.4
487.4
971.6 1,106.20 1,101.90 1,652.40 1,243.20
419.5
508.4
301.8
350.8
474.5
591.3
829.5
2,868.60 2,606.70 3,077.80 3,159.30 4,029.00 5,259.30 6,002.20
31.9
98.9
85.1
95.8
85.9
144.7
683.2
31.6 *
*
1,374.00 1,490.60 1,560.20 2,069.80
317.6
314.1
464
465.7 *
*
*
18.3
0.2
39.2
83.8
383.7
510.8
720.9
356
322.4
330.1
570.7
828.7 1,059.20 1,382.00
313.9
407.5
454.9
986.6 1,278.60 2,523.60 2,715.90
4,780.80 4,595.70 5,256.70 6,805.40 7,639.50 10,395.90 12,484.20
274.2
214
213
155
224.3
361.4
408.9
194.7
170.5
258.2
261.2
363
403
502.4
3,593.20 3,508.30 4,080.00 8,119.50 10,277.00 10,786.60 14,417.40
366.2
191.4
232.3 *
*
*
*
14550.9
13425.5
15764.7 23,534.00 28,176.70 35,248.40 43,459.60

2009
1,107.80
667.4
5,253.10
280.4
1,772.40

2010
1,194.70
1,249.60
6,835.10
208.2
1,642.00

2011
1,114.30
810.5
4,722.90
150.8
1,731.00

*

*
*
665.5
665.5
216.9
1,126.30 1,105.00
902.8
2,713.20 3,159.70 1,466.90
10,792.20 11,556.30 8,501.10
303.9
503.1
236.4
501.3
570.6
392.4
12,210.90 11,673.40 9,756.90
*
390.9
317.6
37,394.40 40,754.10 30,320.50

Table 4a displays the foreign trade that the United States exports to each oppressive
regime, and Table 4b displays the foreign trade that the United States imports from each
oppressive regime in the Middle East from 2002 until 2011. These numbers represent US
dollars in millions. These figures were drawn from the United States Census Bureau for
each of the ten years shown. 147

Table 4b: Total International Trade Imports in Millions
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Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Lebanon
Libya
Oman
Qatar
Saudia Arabia
Syria
Tunisia
U.A.E.
Yemen
Total

Total International Trade Imports in Millions
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2,360.20 4,748.40 7,409.50 10,446.40 15,455.90 17,816.10 19,354.80
394.7
378.2
405.3
431.6
632.4
624.6
538.9
1,355.90 1,143.00 1,283.80 2,091.20 2,395.80 2,376.70
2,370.40
156.3
161.3
151.6
174.5
157.2
173.1
104.1
3,548.40 *
*
9,053.70 11,545.80 11,395.60 22,079.80
61.8
92.3
74.5
86.4 *
*
*
0.00
0
331.6 1,590.30 2,472.20 3,385.20
4,178.60
400.5
694.7
418
555
908.7 1,040.90
851.9
484.6
331.4
387.4
447.9
261.8
477.1
484.3
13,149.90 18,068.60 20,958.70 27,192.60 31,689.00 35,626.00 54,747.40
160.9
246.1
267.8
323.6
213.8
110.5
352.1
93.1
102.4
209.1
263.8
470.3
457.6
644.1
922.9 1,128.00 1,142.70 1,468.30 1,385.40 1,337.50
1,286.20
246.3
66.2
61.5 *
*
*
*
23,335.50 27,160.60 33,101.50 54,125.30 67,588.30 74,820.90 106,992.60

2009
2010
2011
10,717.80 14,518.00 10,960.50
463.5
420.3
355
2,057.70 2,238.20 1,266.00
64.6
94.5
0.7
9,263.30 12,143.30 11,885.30
*
*
*
1,918.50 2,116.80
555.6
907.4
773.3 1,332.20
505.8
466.4
886.5
22,053.10 31,412.80 29,574.30
303.1
429.3
320.7
325.8
405.5
213.2
1,498.00 1,145.40 1,608.40
*
181.4
359.7
50,078.60 66,345.20 59,318.10
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The largest recipients of trade exports to the United States between 2002 and 2011
were Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. All three slowly increased from
2002 on and all three also reached their peak in 2008 and made a small decline until
2011. Oman, Libya, Iran, Algeria, and Iraq all had much smaller numbers of exports but
also peaked in 2008. Bahrain, Qatar, and Syria had similar small numbers while topping
out in 2009. Lebanon had small numbers with their peak in 2005 and then was no longer
considered oppressive after 2005. Yemen maintains low numbers before and after it’s
considered partly free while increasing in 2011. Overall, the total amounts of trade
exports are steady through 2003; it then increases from 2004 until it reaches its highest
point at 43,459.6 $US Million in 2008. In declines in 2009, increases in 2010, and then
declines again in 2011.
The largest recipients of trade imports from the United States between 2002 and 2011
are Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia
all increase from 2002 until they peak in 2008. Tunisia has much lower numbers while
also peaking in 2008. Egypt’s peak occurs in 2006 along with Bahrain who had much
148
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lower numbers. Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman all have lower
numbers while peaking in 2011. Syria peaks in 2010, Lebanon in 2003, and Iran in 2007
all with relatively lower numbers. The overall trend seems to be that the highest amounts
of imported and exported foreign trade between these countries and the United States
occurs in 2008. Overall, the total amounts of trade imports steadily increase yearly from
2002 until it reaches its highest at 106,992.60 $US Million in 2008. It is then more than
halved in 2009, with a small increase in 2010, and a small decrease in 2011.
Overall, United States FMS and ESF stay relatively stable throughout the ten year
period. Some spikes occur within Iraq in both FMS and ESF from 2005 to 2007 because
of the continued war effort there. Aid to the other countries stays relatively stable
throughout the study. International trade imports and exports also paint a similar picture.
Each statistic rises from 2002 on, and both reach their peak in 2008. I now turn to the
country by country and regional analysis of anti-Americanism in the Middle East.

2.5 Analysis of Anti-Americanism in the Middle East from 2002-2011
Levels of anti-Americanism are measured by survey analysis of dozens of surveys
performed by the Pew Research Center, Gallup, Zogby International, World Public
Opinion, Terror Free Tomorrow, the Arab Barometer, and the World Values Survey. The
dependent variable of anti-Americanism is measured by country in terms of level of
favorability or public support for the United States. I have also calculated the mean of the
six case countries in order to study regional perceptions. The year by year results are
compiled together and given one number out of 100. For example, lower numbers
account for a low favorability of the United States and higher anti-Americanism, while
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higher numbers account for a higher favorability and lower anti-Americanism. For years
that had more than one survey preformed, the mean of the results was calculated into one
number. My results are shown below in Table 5 and Figure 1.

Table 2.5: Yearly Totals of Anti-Americanism Levels in the Middle East

Egypt
Jordan
Lebanon
Morocco
Saudi Arabia
Turkey
Mean

2002
15
27
34
30
14
35
25.83

2003
13
3
19
6
4
15
10

2004
4
10
20
11
4
30
13.17

2005
14
27
37
34
9
23
24

2006
22
10
28
7
11
12
15

2007
15
20
47
15
40
9
24.33

2008
12
17
32
26
13
12
18.67

2009
26
22
41
36
34
14
28.33

2010
15
19
36
14
24
17
20.83
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Figure 2.1: Yearly Totals of US Favorability Levels in the Middle East
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Zogby 2010, http://www.aaiusa.org/index_ee.php/reports/2010-six-nation-poll
Pew 2001-2008, http://pewglobal.org/2008/12/18/global-public-opinion-in-the-bush-years-2001-2008/
Gallup 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1843838.stm
Pew 2011, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1997/international-poll-arab-spring-us-obama-image-muslimpublics
Terror Free Tomorrow, http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/articlenav.php?id=5
World Public Opinion, 2003-2009
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricara/663.php?lb=brme&pnt=663&nid=
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Zogby 2011, “Arab Attitudes, 2011,” Arab American Institute Foundation, 3.
Pew 2009, http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1289/global-attitudes-survey-2009-obama-lifts-america-image
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2011
12
11
36
12
30
10
18.5

In the following section, I analyze the regional and country by country polling
data. I begin with a descriptive analysis of the year by year polling data. I then test
correlations between the polling data and the operational indicators of United States’
support for oppressive regimes. Correlation tables were performed for each operational
indicator and the regional and country by country approval levels. There will be four
tables for the regional analysis and four for each country (one table for each operational
indicator). The statistical significance is measured at the .05 level. 150

Regional Trends

150

The correlation tables are found in the Appendix, and Table 6 displays the correlation data on pg. 28.
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Figure 2.2: Regional Mean of US Favorability, 2002-2011

As indicated in Figure 2, the regional levels of anti-Americanism begin in 2002 at
24.83%. It severely drops in 2003 to its lowest point at 10%, and then makes a small
improvement in 2004 at 13.17%. Trends continue to increase in 2005 at 24%, but then
witness a setback in 2006 at 15%. This repeats itself in 2007 when public support reaches
24.33% and then drops back down to 18.67% in 2008. Levels of public support reach
their highest point in 2009 at 28.33%, and then witness a steady decline in 2010 at
20.83% and in 2011 at 18.5%.
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Egypt
Figure 3: Level of approval for the US in Egypt, 2002-2011

Egypt
30
25
20
15

Egypt

10
5
0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

As shown in Figure 3, the level of public support for the United States in Egypt
begins in 2002 at 15%. It takes a small drop in 2003 and then a severe drop in 2004 at
4%. Perceptions get better in 2005 and continue in 2006 at 22%. Approval again begins
to drop in 2007 and lower in 2008 at 12%. Support jumps to its highest in 2009 at 26%
but then falls back down in 2010 and 2011 at 12%. The mean for Egypt is 14.8%. I will
focus on the outlier years of 2004, 2006, and 2009. The year 2006 witnesses the largest
increase in anti-Americanism while 2006 and 2009 both witness large decreases in antiAmericanism.
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Jordan
Figure 4: Level of approval for the US in Jordan, 2002-2011
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As displayed in Figure 4, Jordanian approval of the United States begins at its
highest in 2002 at 27%; it then plummets to its lowest level of 3% in 2003. Support
begins to climb in 2004 and it matches its highest level in 2005. In 2006 it drops and then
averages out at around 20% for the next four years until it drops again in 2011. The
outlier years for high levels of anti-Americanism are 2003, 2004, and 2006. The years
with the lowest levels of anti-Americanism are 2002 and 2005 while the rest of the years
stay relatively average.

Morocco
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Figure 5: Level of approval for the US in Morocco, 2002-2011
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As shown in Figure 5, the level of approval for the United States in Morocco
begins at 30% in 2002 and then makes a massive decline in 2003 at 6%. It makes a small
increase in 2004 and then a gigantic increase in 2005 at 34%. It sharply decreases again
in 2006 at 7%, and then begins a steady climb from 2006 until it reaches its highest point
in 2009 at 36%. Finally, it remarkably decreases again in 2010 and 2011. The years with
the highest levels of anti-Americanism are 2003, 2004, and 2006. The lowest levels of
anti-Americanism occur in 2002, 2005, and 2009.

Saudi Arabia
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Figure 6: Level of approval for the US in Saudi Arabia, 2002-2011
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As shown in Figure 6, Saudi Arabia’s support for the United States begins at 14%
in 2002 and witnesses extreme lows in 2003 and 2004 at 4%. It then slowly climbs in
2005 and 2006, until it reaches its highest point in 2007 at 40%. Approval drops to 13%
in 2008 and then bounces back up in 2009. 2010 witnesses a small decrease in support
and finally a small increase in 2011. The years with the highest levels of antiAmericanism are 2003, 2004, and 2005, with the lowest levels of anti-Americanism
occurring in 2007, 2009, and 2011.

Turkey
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Figure 7: Level of approval for the US in Turkey, 2002-2011
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As displayed in Figure 7, public support for the United States in Turkey begins at
35% in 2002; it then significantly decreases in 2003. It jumps back up in 2004, and then
begins to steadily decline from 2004 to 2007 when it reaches its low of 9%. It slowly
increases from 2007 to 2010, and then slightly falls again in 2011 at 10%. The years with
the highest amounts of anti-Americanism are 2003, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2011.
The years that stand out with lower levels of anti-Americanism are 2002, 2004, and 2005.

Table 2.6: Regional and Country by Country Correlation Data
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Regional and Country by Country Correlation Data
FMS
ESF
Imports

Exports

Regional
Pearson Correlation
Sig.

0.113
0.772

0.3
0.433

0.118
0.746

0.387
0.269

Pearson Correlation
Sig.

0.484
0.187

0.302
0.43

0.124
0.733

0.373
0.289

Pearson Correlation
Sig.

-0.013
0.974

0.38
0.313

0.093
0.799

0.24
0.503

Pearson Correlation
Sig.

-0.045
0.908

0.302
0.43

0.054
0.883

0.203
0.575

Pearson Correlation
Sig.

0.384
0.307

0.11
0.778

0.33
0.352

0.627
0.052

Pearson Correlation
Sig.

-0.743
0.022

-0.316
0.407

-0.658
0.039

-0.659
0.038

Pearson Correlation
Sig.

0.395
0.292

0.445
0.23

0.411
0.239

0.616
0.058

Egypt

Jordan

Morocco

Saudi Arabia

Turkey

Lebanon

The above charts show that there is not a significant correlation at the .05 level
between regional levels of anti-Americanism between 2002 and 2011 and levels of FMS
or ESF. They also show that there is no correlation between regional anti-American
levels and trade imports or exports. There is also no significant correlation at the .05 level
between levels of anti-Americanism in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and
Lebanon and levels of FMS, ESF, Imports, and Exports.
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However, anti-Americanism levels in Turkey from 2002 to 2011 and levels of
FMS are significant at the .05 level. The correlation shows a negative relationship in
which increased levels of FMS cause a decrease in public support for the United States.
They show that there is no correlation at the .05 level between levels of ESF and antiAmerican levels in Turkey. They also show that there is a significant correlation at the
.05 level between Turkish anti-Americanism levels and foreign trade imports and exports.
Similar to FMS, the charts show that there is a negative relationship in which an increase
in levels of trade imports and exports causes a decrease in Turkish approval of the United
States.

Lebanon
The case of Lebanon is much different from the other cases in that it begins as an
oppressive regime and then after the Cedar Revolution of 2005 becomes partially free.
This gives an important insight into the public perceptions of a state before and after
regime change and transition to a freer democracy. It also allows me to compare United
States’ support prior to and after the revolution to determine if aid was higher during the
oppressive regime or after. In the following section, I give a descriptive analysis of
Lebanon’s approval of the US from 2002-2011, a brief overview of the Cedar
Revolution, an analysis of United States support during and after the revolution, and an
analysis of Lebanese favorability of the United States before and after the revolution.
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Figure 2.8: Level of approval for the US in Lebanon, 2002-2011
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As indicated in Figure 8, the level of support for the United States in Lebanon
begins at 34% in 2002; it then drops to its lowest level in 2003 at 19%. It then remains
steady in 2004 and makes an immense increase in 2005 at 37%. There was a small drop
in 2006 and a then it reaches its peak in 2007 at 47%. 2008 witnesses another small drop
in support; it then makes a small increase again in 2009 and remains somewhat steady
through 2011. The calculated mean for approval of the United States in Lebanon is 33%.
The outlier years with high levels of anti-Americanism are 2003 and 2004. The outlier
years with the lowest levels of anti-Americanism are 2007 and 2009.
The state of Greater Lebanon was created under the French mandate following
World War I in 1920. 151 Heavily influenced by the French, Lebanon adopted a
confessional system of politics in which the President would always be a Maronite
Christian, the Prime Minister would always be Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the

151

D.K. Fieldhouse, “Lebanon and the French, 1918-1946,” in Western Imperialism in the Middle East
1914-1958 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 304.
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House would always be Shiah Muslim.152 Lebanon achieved its independence from the
French in 1943, and the French left the country by 1946.Dispite the influx in Palestinian
refugees following the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, Lebanon remained relatively stable
until the political crisis of 1958. (Discussed further in Chapter Four) Violence broke out
again into an all-out civil war in 1975 following the relocation of the PLO and arming of
Christian and Muslim militias. 153 Lebanon was then occupied by Syria after 1976 when
Syria entered the country to enforce a cease-fire to the civil war. 154 Israel invaded and
occupied the South of Lebanon in 1982. (Discussed further in Chapter Three) Lebanon
had witnessed years of sectarian violence between Christians backed by Israel and
Muslims backed by Syria. The Taif Accords ended Lebanon’s civil war in 1990, revising
the Lebanese constitution and allowing Syria to remain in a position of influence in the
country. Syria’s presence in Lebanon deepened in the 1990s when Syrian intelligence
infiltrated the Lebanese electoral system. This allowed Syria to place loyalists in
important positions within Lebanon’s government. 155 Oussama Safa writes, “The
Lebanese Parliament elections in 1992, 1996, and 2000 all had Syrian-aligned majorities.
Reliable Syrian allies began to fill the military’s officer corps and the security services as
well as senior civilian posts.” 156 However, there was one politician who publicly opposed
the Syrian occupation, and who became extremely popular in the coming years. Rafiq
Hariri, a Sunni Muslim, became Prime Minister in 1992 and was able to garner support
from Christians and Muslims alike. Oussama further asserts, “Hariri steamed full-speed
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ahead with his plans to rebuild the country and restart economic growth. His commitment
to economic liberalism and free markets helped to jolt awake a lethargic economy.” 157
Hariri further angered the Syrians in 2004 when he formed an anti-Syrian
coalition with Druze, Christians, and Sunnis committed to upholding UN Resolution
1559, which called for the removal of all foreign troops from Lebanon. 158 On February
14, 2005, a massive car bomb killed Hariri and twenty-one others. This became known as
the Saint Valentine’s Day assassination and it sparked a huge uproar of support for Hariri
and protest of the Syrian occupation. The protests were completely peaceful and were the
largest the Arab world had seen at the time. Oussama writes, “On March 14, an estimated
1.2 million protesters – more than a quarter of Lebanon’s population – thronged Beirut in
order to demand Syria’s withdrawal.” 159 The demonstrators used the Lebanese flag as
their protest symbol. The flag has a green cedar tree in the middle of it, therefore this
movement became known as the cedar revolution. The United States and France applied
pressure to Syria, and by May the last Syrian troops had withdrawn from Lebanon.
Tables 7 and 8 below show United States’ support for Lebanon in the form of
FMS, ESF, Trade Imports and Trade Exports. This data shows that while Lebanon was an
oppressive regime, from 2002 until 2005, United States’ support was extremely low.
However, after the Syrian occupation is over and Lebanon holds free elections, from
2006 until 2011, United States’ support increases substantially. In all four categories,
(FMS, ESF, Imports, and Exports) United States’ support is much higher from 20062011. The case of Lebanon shows that the United States gave little support to the
oppressive regime, and much higher support to the free democratic regime. Table 8 also
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shows that Lebanon’s average approval of the United States makes a significant increase
from 2002-2005 to 2006-2011. This shows that Lebanon gave the United States credit in
applying pressure to Syria and aiding them as a non-oppressive regime.

Table 2.7: United States’ Support for Lebanon, 2002-2011

FMS
ESF
Imports
Exports

2002
0.6
15.2
61.8
317.6

2003
0.7
66.7
92.3
314.1

United States' Support for Lebanon
2004
2005
2006
2007
0.7
0.8
31
9.1
35.9
24.5
143.7
200
74.5
86.4
89.1
104
464
465.7
930.7
825.9

2008
8.4
189.8
99.1
1463.8

2009
2010
2011
60.5
2.5 *
154.7
156.4 *
77
83.9
74.3
1852.1 2,008.80 1,675.20

Table 2.8: United States’ Support for Lebanon, Mean Totals
United States' Support for Lebanon
Mean from 2002-2005 Mean from 2006-2011
FMS
0.7
18.58
ESF
35.57
140.76
Imports
78.75
87.9
Exports
390.35
8756.5
Approval of the U.S.
27.5
36.67

Summary
Overall, the regional perceptions and most of the country by country perceptions
did not correlate with United States’ support for oppressive regimes. However, Turkey
did have correlations with three out of the four operational indicators which shows a
strong relationship between United States support for oppressive regime and Turkish
public opinion of the United States. The correlation test for Turkey also shows a negative
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relationship which means that when US support for oppressive regimes increases, the
approval of the United States decreases. This is the expected relationship predicted by
Hypothesis 1. The case of Lebanon also made a strong case for Hypothesis 1 by showing
the positive relationship between the United States’ lack of support for their oppressive
regime and support for the post-oppressive democracy. The mean for Lebanon’s
perceptions of the United States were nearly ten percentage points better after the
oppressive regime ended. In the following section, I conclude this chapter by discussing
the 2011 Arab Spring and its policy implications for the United States.

2.6 Analysis of Democracy in the Arab Spring and Possible Shift in US Foreign
Policy
The Arab Spring was a protest movement that began in January of 2011.
Demonstrations were first inspired by the ousting of Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine
Ben Ali and quickly spread from Egypt to Libya and throughout the Middle East. The
BBC writes, “Public anger had been sparked by the suicide of a young, unemployed man,
Mohamed Bouazizi, who set fire to himself on 17 December after officials had blocked
his attempts to make a living selling vegetables.” 160 Ben Ali and his government were
ousted on January 14, 2011, which only added more fuel to the spreading protests. Egypt
was the next country to witness their leader step down amid demonstrations when
President Hosni Mubarak resigned on February 11, 2011. Libyan protests erupted into
civil war and finally an overthrow of the government on August 23, 2011. Former ruler
of Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, was then killed on October 20, 2011. Yemen is also on the
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brink of civil war as President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, is attempting to hold on to power.
Similarly, in Syria, President Bashar al-Assad is holding on to power while violently
oppressing protesters. The BBC writes, “Since the first protests in mid-March in the city
of Deraa, at least 2,700 Syrians have died.” 161 Further demonstrations were conducted in
Bahrain, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.
The United States has been publicly supporting the Arab Spring and most of the
regime changes it is caused since its inception. The United States publicly supported Ben
Ali’s resignation in Tunisia, and then in a speech on February 2, 2011, President Obama
called for Egyptian President Mubarak to step aside. 162 On March 3, 2011, President
Obama called for Libyan dictator Gaddafi to step down. 163 The United States also later
supported the rebels against the Libyan government by supplying arms and giving air
support. In May of 2011, the United States called for Yemeni president Saleh to step
down amid protests and war in his country. Furthermore, the United States also publicly
called for Syrian president Assad to leave power after reports of his regime killing
thousands of civilians. 164
Have these actions been a change in US foreign policy? If so, has this change affected
anti-Americanism in the Middle East? Both Mubarak and Ben Ali were considered close
allies of the United States. Saleh was also seen as important ally of the United States in
the war on terrorism, and US relations with Gaddafi were much better following his
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renunciation of terrorism and the sacrifice of his nuclear ambitions in 2003. The United
States also never called for Mubarak to step down in the past even though his elections
were often seen as fraudulent. 165 However the Bush Administration’s “Freedom Agenda”
did push for democratic reforms in Egypt by giving aid to reformist NGOs, civil society
outreach, and pressuring for the release of Egyptian dissidents. 166 However, the Bush
Administration never went as far as to call for regime change in Egypt, but neither did the
Obama Administration before the Arab Spring protests.
The 2011 survey results seem to show that even though the Arab Spring might mark a
change in US foreign policy, anti-Americanism continued to increase. The Pew Research
Center writes, “A new survey finds that the rise of pro-democracy movements has not led
to an improvement in America's image in the region. Instead, in key Arab nations and in
other predominantly Muslim countries, views of the U.S. remain negative, as they have
been for nearly a decade.” 167 My findings paint a similar picture. Of the six countries that
I analyzed, five of them witnessed an increase in anti-Americanism between 2010 and
2011. Lebanon was the only country that’s perceptions stayed the same at 36% approval.
Several surveys have concluded that the 2009 election of President Obama marked a
large decrease in anti-Americanism throughout the Middle East. 168 This is most likely
because the Obama Administration was seen as a change from the unpopular Bush
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Administration. My findings also reflect this argument. All six of the countries that I
analyzed witnessed significant decreases in anti-Americanism from 2008 to 2009.
However, this support for President Obama seems to be very short lived. Even with the
possible changes in US foreign policy in 2011, perceptions of the United States have
plummeted. Of the six countries being analyzed, three witnessed higher levels of antiAmericanism in 2011 than in 2008, the last year of the Bush Administration.
Is it possible that the Middle Eastern publics just are not convinced yet? Robert Jervis
argues that perceptions are difficult to change, even with significant foreign policy
changes. He calls this phenomenon “perceptual predisposition,” and he contends that this
is caused by a history of reoccurring experiences. 169 Jervis writes, “This means that when
a statesman has developed a certain image of another country he will maintain that view
in the face of large amounts of discrepant information.” 170 The evidence supports this
theory as many in the Middle East believe that the United States has acted hypocritically
by calling out the regimes in Libya, Egypt, and Syria but ignoring similar oppressive
treatment in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. 171

Summary
What do these survey and analysis findings mean for the United States? Although, the
survey results have shown little correlation between US support for oppressive regimes
and anti-Americanism in the Middle East, I do not believe that this totally discounts
Hypothesis 1. United States’ support for oppressive regimes has not drastically changed
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in the past decade. Although there is some difference from year to year as far as military,
economic, and foreign trade, it is very likely that the average Middle Eastern citizen is
unaware of these differences. These findings do not show that US support for oppressive
regimes is not a cause of anti-Americanism, but they do show that there are other factors
that need to be explored.
The case of Lebanon is an example of success for the United States. This should be
used as a model on how to address the regime changes caused by the Arab Spring.
Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution has many parallels to the protests and demonstrations of the
Arab Spring. The United States gave little support to the oppressive regime in Lebanon
prior to 2005. The United States then applied pressure to the oppressive regime during
the Cedar Revolution and immediately showed support for the new government in
Lebanon. This resulted in a significantly higher public approval level of the United States
by the Lebanese people. This case shows that the United States got credit for not
supporting an oppressive regime which gives support to Hypothesis 1. However, it is not
too late for the United States to change public opinion in the Middle East. If this model
could be applied to the current Arab Spring, the United States could realize much more
support by the Middle Eastern publics in the years to come. In the following chapter, I
analyze the United States support for Israel and its affect on public opinion of the United
States in the Middle East.
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3. The “Special Relationship”: The United States’ Support for Israel
“[A]t the heart of Arab attitudes are resentment of U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli
conflict.”
-Shibley Telhami 172
3.1 Introduction
Many scholars have argued that the United States’ support for Israel is the leading
cause of anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Marc Lynch argues that anti-Americanism
in the Middle East began with the United States’ support for Israel during the 1967 ArabIsraeli War, and that this support “reshaped a relatively fluid Arab political opinion into a
more pervasive distrust.” 173 Steven Kull writes, “The emergence of Israel as a nonMuslim state in the Muslim world, closely allied with and supported by America,
contributes to the narrative of America as seeking to dominate the Muslim world and
undermine Islam.” 174 The available polling data supports the claims that US policy
toward the Arab-Israeli conflict is the foundation for anti-American sentiment in the
Middle East. James Zogby asserts, “Nine out of ten respondents in every Arab nation
gave a negative rating to the U.S. handling of the Palestinian conflict—an issue viewed
uniformly as ‘the most important’ or ‘a very important’ concern facing the Arab world
today.” 175 These scholars admit that there are many issues that spawn anti-Americanism
throughout the Middle East, but they agree that the overarching issue is the United States
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support for Israel. “No other issue resonates with the public in the Arab world, and many
other parts of the Muslim world, more deeply than Palestine,” writes Shibley Telhami,
“No other issue shapes the regional perceptions of America more fundamentally than the
issue of Palestine.” 176
This chapter analyzes Middle Eastern public opinion between 2002 and 2011
against measures of US support for Israel. If Hypothesis 2 is correct (The United States’
support for Israel causes an increase in negative public perceptions of the United States in
the Middle East), levels of anti-Americanism should increase along with increased
support of Israel by the United States. This chapter provides the history behind the ArabIsraeli conflict up until 2011, including an analysis of United States’ support for Israel,
and tests correlations between regional and country by country polling data. Finally, I
discuss possible policy shifts and public statements by the Obama Administration and
whether or not these events have had any effect on Middle Eastern public opinion.

3.2 The United States’ Historical Support for Israel
The United States’ first involvement with the Arab-Israeli conflict came with
President Wilson’s support of the Zionist project in Palestine during World War I. 177
Initially, Wilson’s support for the Jewish population occurred for humanitarian reasons,
and was not politically motivated. However, the growing population of American
Zionists began to apply pressure to the White House in order to gain more support for the
Jewish settlers in Palestine Zionism as “a nationalist movement that seeks the creation of
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a homeland, in effect a nation-state, for the Jews.” 178 Zionism “sought to establish a
publicly recognized, legally secure home for the Jews in Palestine, their ‘historic
homeland,’ where they would make up a Jewish majority in a Jewish state and thus be
able to guarantee future generations freedom from persecution.” 179 President Wilson also
received pressure from Britain to publicly support the Zionist cause, but he and his
Administration were skeptical of making such a move. Despite his suspicions, Wilson
ultimately agreed to support the Balfour Declaration, which was the British cabinet’s
ambiguous commitment to ensuring Jewish statehood. 180
After World War I, during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 the fate of the
former Ottoman Empire in the Middle East was to be decided. President Wilson, a
proponent of self-determination, was skeptical of British and French involvement in the
Middle East. 181 Wilson sent an international fact finding mission to the Middle East to
administer the regions first public opinion polls and determine what the Middle Eastern
people wanted their own futures to be. This was known as the King-Crane Commission
and was met with objections by both the Europeans and the Zionists. The Commission
found that the Arabs in the Middle East were skeptical of French and British rule, and
even more against the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine. Oren writes, “Arab rejection of
Zionism was ‘intense,’ the commissioners found.” 182 However, despite the commission’s
findings and President Wilson’s complaints, the British and French received mandates of
the former Ottoman territory in the Middle East from the newly formed League of
Nations. Syria and Lebanon fell under French influence, while most of Iraq, Jordan, and
178
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Palestine fell under British influence. It was also at this time when the British began to
allow for more Jewish immigration to Palestine and began to play the Zionists and Arabs
against one another. This weakened both sides and allowed the British to exert more
control over the region. 183
Despite the divide and rule tactics of the British, Tessler contends that Palestine
still remained relatively free from violence until around 1929. Before this period, Tessler
asserts, “Arab and Jewish society evolved side by side, but contact between the two
communities was limited. Cordial and even friendly relations were not unknown at the
individual level, especially in the early years of the mandate.” 184 However, the
Palestinian and Jewish communities began to grow very distant from one another and a
mutual distrust formed by the end of the 1920s. Violent riots broke out in August of 1929
amid disagreement on whose right it was to pray at the Temple Mount, the holiest site in
Judaism and location of the al-Aqsa Mosque, which is the third holiest site in Islam. 185
British security forces were unable to control the violent mobs as hundred were killed on
both sides of the conflict. 186 Tensions continued to mount throughout the 1930s as the
British were desperate to find a peaceful solution. The idea of a partition was discussed,
but both the Arabs and Jews found problems with the idea and the two sides were locked
in a stalemate by the end of 1930s. 187
World War II ignited in 1939 and brought with it the horrors of the Holocaust.
This became the darkest chapter in Jewish history as roughly six million Jews were killed
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in the Nazi death camps, which was almost 90 percent of Europe’s Jewish population. 188
However, even with its atrocities, the Holocaust did work in favor for the Zionists in
accomplishing their ultimate goal of a Jewish state. Dowty writes, “From the Jewish
perspective, the Holocaust – the killing of one-third of the Jewish people, the largest mass
murder in history – created an unanswerable humanitarian cause for a Jewish state.” 189
The Holocaust proved to the majority of Jews around the world that their time had come
to create a nation state. 190 They believed that they could no longer rely on anyone else to
protect them, and that they now would have to protect themselves. “After the
Holocaust,” Dowty asserts, “almost all Jews accepted the basic tenet of Zionism: Jews
needed a state of their own, if only to insure their physical survival.” 191
The Holocaust also made a huge impact on world opinion, and in particular the
United States. By 1944, the issue of Jewish statehood was increasingly evident in
American politics. Lesch writes, “Both houses of Congress introduced resolutions urging
unrestricted Jewish immigration to Palestine and called for the eventual establishment of
a Jewish state there. In the 1944 presidential election campaign, both parties for the first
time adopted pro-Zionist positions in their respective platforms.” 192 The United States
began to apply pressure to Britain for a decision resolution on the issue of Jewish
statehood. Not knowing how to resolve the issue, the British decided to defer the
problem to the newly formed United Nations (UN). 193 The UN formed the United
Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) which recommended a partition of
Palestine, creating an Arab and Jewish state.
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On November 27, 1947, the UN passed General Assembly Resolution 181 which
adopted UNSCOP’s two-state solution. 194 The Arab Palestinians strongly rejected the
UN’s decision, which they saw as a catastrophe. The Jewish settlers accepted the
resolution which they saw as a great step toward their legitimacy. With the passing of this
landmark resolution, war immediately erupted on the streets of Palestine. Tessler writes,
“On November 30, there were Arab attacks on Jews in many cities, including Haifa, Tel
Aviv, Jaffa, Lydda, and Jerusalem. There were also anti-Jewish riots in Beirut, Aleppo,
Damascus, Baghdad, and a number of other Arab cities outside Palestine.” 195 The British
were trying to escape the war zone, while the Jews were fighting for their new state, and
the Arabs were fighting for their old land.
The initial civil war began with some Arab victories, but after months of fighting
the Jewish immigrants began to take control over almost all of their territory allocated by
the UN and some sections of Palestinian land. By May 14, 1948, the last of British
Commissioners were gone and the Palestinian guerilla army had collapsed. 196 On that
same day, the newly formed National Council gathered in Tel Aviv and declared
independence and the establishment of Israel.
Initially, support for Israel was seen as a detriment to the United States’ national
interests by members of the Truman Administration. 197 However, President Truman
eventually decided against members of the State Department and his own administration
and was the first head of state to officially recognize and give support to the newly
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independent state of Israel in 1948. 198 Vaughn Shannon writes, “The seeds of a new US
ally in the Middle East were planted that day, which would prove useful in an emerging
cold war, but so too emerged widespread anti-American resentment out of the awkward
attempt at compromise over the fate of the land known as Palestine.” 199 This was also the
beginning of the Israel lobby in the United States which put domestic pressures on
Truman in an election year, where key states such as New York depended on a large
Jewish vote. 200 John Measheimer and Stephen Walt argue that the Israel lobby is a “loose
coalition of individuals and organizations that actively work to shape U.S. foreign policy
in a pro-Israel direction.” 201 Peter Hahn argues that it was these “pro-Zionist” lobbyists
who influenced Truman to side against his national security advisors. 202
The Arab-Israeli war of 1948 set the stage for the conflict that would dominate the
region for the next half a century. For its Jewish inhabitants, the creation of Israel was
seen as the greatest moment in the Jewish peoples’ long history of tragedies. For the Arab
inhabitants, the creation of Israel was seen as the ultimate disaster that would leave the
Palestinian people homeless for years to come. 203 After the war, Israel received
membership in the UN and a general legitimization from the international community,
although not from their neighbors. However, the war left many unanswered questions.
Israel’s borders were not officially accepted by its neighbors, although the armistice lines
became Israel’s de facto borders. Israel’s Arab neighbors did not participate in the
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partition process, thus leaving hundreds of thousands of Palestinians without a home.
Instead of allowing the remaining Palestinian territory to be ruled by Palestinians, Egypt
and Jordan largely ruled over the area by themselves. This created a massive Palestinian
refugee problem that is still not resolved to this day. 204
Even though the United States was the first state to publicly endorse the creation
of Israel, the US did not blindly support all of Israel’s actions. The Eisenhower
Administration stood up to Israel and two more of its close allies in Britain and France
during the Suez War of 1956. Israel, Britain, and France were concerned with Egyptian
President, Nasser, and his nationalization of the Suez Canal. In an attempt to oust Nasser,
Israel concocted a plan with the British and French with the goal of starting a war with
Egypt in which the French and British could intervene and take back the canal. After the
invasion began, the Eisenhower Administration proposed a cease-fire resolution in the
UN and threatened the Israelis and the British with economic sanctions unless they
withdrew all forces from Egyptian territory. 205 The United States also drafted a UN
Security Council resolution calling for Israel to remove all of its forces from Egypt, but
the resolution was vetoed by the British and the French. 206 This event showed that the
United States did not always blindly support Israel, and it also proved to the Eisenhower
Administration that they needed to develop a stronger presence in the Middle East.
Because of the faltering of the British and French, a power vacuum existed in the Middle
East in the late 1950s, and many in the Eisenhower Administration were concerned with
204

Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 279.
Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 91.
Lesch, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 165-6.
205
Lesch, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 181-2.
206
United Nations, “Middle East: UNEF Background,”
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1backgr2.html (Accessed February 28, 2012)
Shannon, Balancing Act, 53.
79

an increase in Soviet influence in the region. The United States responded with the
Eisenhower Doctrine which “offered U.S. military and economic aid to any country in
the Middle East that requested it in order to fend off the advances of international
communism.” 207
The Cold War strengthened and shaped the United States’ relationship with Israel
because Israel was seen as an important ally in the Middle East that could assist in
deterring a Soviet presence. A “special relationship” 208 between the United States and
Israel began to develop under the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. This time
period saw the United States lift the arms embargo, which had been established at the
outbreak of Israel’s War of Independence in 1948, and begin to assist Israel with US
military aid. 209 Shannon writes, “Kennedy in 1962 had authorized the sale of American
Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, defensive weapons totaling five batteries and 21.5 million.
By early 1965, the US had sold and delivered 200 tanks totaling $34 million.” 210 Israel
was also the largest recipient of economic aid at this time. 211 Unlike Eisenhower,
Kennedy and Johnson also opened up to the Israel lobby, which saw Kennedy take home
80 percent of the Jewish vote in the election of 1960. 212
Tensions began to rise between Israel and its neighbors in 1966 when Israel and
Syria fought a battle on the Sea of Galilee. Guerilla warfare was also conducted from
Palestinian groups along the Israel-Jordan border and Israel-Syria border in the early
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months of 1967. 213 Meanwhile, Egypt had signed a mutual defense pact with Syria and
Jordan, and began to move troops along its border with Israel because Egypt was
concerned that Israel would invade Syria. 214 Iraq also began to move troops into Jordan
in case war broke out. 215
By June 5, 1967, Israel launched a massive preemptive strike against Egypt,
Syria, and Jordan. Within hours, Israel had decimated Egyptian air forces, leaving
Egyptian ground forces unprotected. 216 Lesch writes, “With Egypt essentially knocked to
its knees within hours, it was just a matter of time before Israel defeated the Jordanians
and Syrians.” 217 By June 11, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt agreed to a cease-fire, and this
conflict became known by Israelis as the Six Day War. Even though the war only lasted
for a few days, for the Arabs, the damage was done. During the conflict, Israel was able
to capture the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt. Israel took the Golan Heights
from Syria, and captured the West Bank including Jerusalem from Jordan. Israel now had
all of the territory of what was known as Palestine, and territory from Egypt, Syria, and
Jordan. 218
This war marked a turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For Israel, it was a
huge success and meant that Israel now had a buffer zone between its neighbors, and the
ability to negotiate land for peace. For the Arabs, it was almost more devastating than the
loss in 1948. Egyptian President, Gemal Abdel Nasser, and his Arab Nationalism
movement were completely defeated. Lesch writes, “Nasserism had come to an effective
213
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end as its standard-bearer was forever tarnished and discredited in the eyes of many. 219
The loss of so much land by the Arabs meant that over 300,000 more Palestinians were
added as refugees, and the Israelis immediately began to settle the new territory which
also remains an ongoing issue to this day. The end of Arab Nationalism marked the
beginning of Islamic fundamentalism, which many Arabs believed was the solution to
their ongoing humiliating defeats. 220
The Six-Day War further strengthened the relationship between the United States
and Israel and this was reflected with the Johnson Administration’s agreement to increase
military aid to Israel in 1968 including the sale of Phantom Jets.221 However, the Six Day
War also further distanced the United States from the Arab regimes in the Middle East
who saw the war as a crushing defeat supported by the United States. 222 The crisis after
the war also interjected the United States into the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as the
Johnson Administration designed UN Security Council Resolution 242, which has served
as a framework for peace ever since. 223
The Nixon Administration continued to support Israel whom National Security Advisor,
Henry Kissinger, believed “would serve American interests by containing both Soviet
communism and Arab radicalism.” 224 This was evident in 1969, when Nixon turned a
blind eye to Israel’s nuclear program and, in 1972, when Nixon increased aid to Israel to
$500 million.225 On October 6, 1973, during the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur and the
Islamic holy month of Ramadan Egypt and Syria conducted a coordinated attack against
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Israel. 226 Dowty writes, “Achieving both strategic and tactical surprise, the two nations
achieved considerable initial success; Egypt established a firm foothold east of the Canal,
and Syria reoccupied most of the Golan Heights before being thrown back a few days
later by hastily mobilized Israeli forces.” 227 These events came as a shock to Israel, who
had not expected any type of Arab attack. Within days, the United States began to airlift
military equipment and supplies to Israel, and the Israeli army began to take back the land
it lost. 228 By October 24, the fighting had ended and Israel had gotten all its land back
and in some areas actually gained more territory. It was at this time the United States
realized the extent to which its relationship with Israel was harmful in 1973 during the
Arab oil embargo. For the first time, the United States’ economy took a blow because of
its foreign policy decision regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. 229 Kissinger enacted his
famous shuttle diplomacy in an attempt to draw down the confrontation that occurred
between Israel and its neighbors in the October war, and improved the United States’
image in the Middle East. By 1974, Kissinger had succeeded in establishing a
disengagement agreement between both Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria. It became
clear that the United States would have to play a key role in negotiating any type of peace
treaty between Israel and its Arab neighbors. 230
By the time that Jimmy Carter was sworn in as president of the United States it
was obvious to him that the Middle East, and in particular the Arab-Israeli conflict, were
high on his list of priorities. The Carter Administration was convinced that a lasting
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peace agreement between Israel and Egypt was possible if the United States acted as a
third party mediator. 231 Although Carter continued to give economic and military support
of Israel, he attempted to establish peace with the landmark Camp David Accords. 232 On
the evening of September 17, 1978, the Camp David Accords were signed by Egyptian
President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Manachem Begin and overseen by
President Carter. 233 The Accords themselves consisted of two separate documents.
Quandt writes, “The first stated general principles and set forth an outline for dealing
with the West Bank and Gaza. The second, loosely tied to the principles stated in the
first, was a detailed formula for reaching an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.” 234 An
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty was finally signed on March 26, 1979, on the north lawn of
the White House. 235
Although peace was finally settled between Egypt and Israel, the rest of Israel’s
neighbors and the Palestinians were largely left out of the equation. Israel continued
building settlements and remained in the territories it occupied after 1967 (besides the
Sinai Peninsula). Hahn writes, “Besieged in his (President Carter’s) own reelection
campaign, he became reluctant to pressure Israel to make concessions.” 236 The Camp
David agreement also increased the amount of aid given to Israel by the United States. 237
Shannon writes, “Secretary of Defense Harold Brown promised Israel $3 billion in
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military assistance, arms requests and oil supply; to Egypt he pledged $1.5 billion in
aid….These generous aid packages subsequently became annual, and Israel and Egypt
had become the top two foreign aid recipients of the United States.” 238
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Iranian revolution in 1979 reinforced
Israel’s perceived importance as a strategic Cold War ally and counter to Islamic
fundamentalism. In 1981, the United States signed the Strategic Cooperation Agreement
with Israel, allowing for joint military exercises, assistance, and planning groups. 239
Mearsheimer and Walt write, “This agreement led to the creation of a Joint Security
Assistance Planning Group (JSAP) and Joint Political Military Group, which meet
regularly to review Israel’s aid requests and to coordinate military plans, joint exercises,
and logistical arrangements.” 240 This ultimately led to the US Congress declaring Israel a
strategic non-NATO ally. The power of the Israeli lobby was also apparent in the 1980s
as it applied pressure to the Congress on matters such as a possible US withdrawal from
the UN if Israel were expelled and halting payments to the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) because of anti-Israeli sentiment. 241
However, the lobby was unable to prevent the United States from selling Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to Saudi Arabia, which Israel strongly
opposed. 242
Tensions again began to rise between Israel and the Palestinians when the PLO
began to use Southern Lebanon as a base of operations for attacking Israel. First in 1978,
then again in June of 1982, Israel, under command of defense minister Ariel Sharon
238
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under Operation Peace for Galilee sent nearly 90,000 Israeli troops into Lebanon. 243
Tessler writes, “Begin had been convinced since the hostilities of the preceding summer
that Israel should drive the PLO out of south Lebanon once and for all.” 244 The original
plan of action was for Israel to extend the nine mile buffer-zone established in 1978 to a
twenty-five mile buffer-zone. However, it soon became apparent that Sharon had plans
for Israel to go all the way to Beirut. This would allow for Israel to remove both the PLO
and the Syrians, thus allowing the Maronites to take back control of Lebanon. 245 Dowty
writes, “He [Sharon] sought a more radical and far-reaching solution: Israel would ally
itself with the Maronites and other anti-Palestinian Lebanese factions; together they
would expel PLO and Syrian forces from the country; and a new Maronite-dominated
Lebanon would make peace with Israel.” 246
Although many in the international community condemned Israel for its invasion
of a sovereign country, the United States did not. The United States did approve a UN
resolution that called for Israel’s withdrawal, but then vetoed a resolution threatening to
apply sanctions to Israel. 247 Stuck in a tough position, the Reagan Administration decided
to send a US peacekeeping force to Lebanon just months after Israel’s invasion. (This is
discussed further in Chapter Four) The goal was to oversee the withdrawal of the PLO,
and it was seen as successful at first, as the peacekeeping force was withdrawn within
weeks of deployment.
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However, the United States did condemn Israel’s bombing of the Osirak nuclear
reactor in Iraq in 1981. The UN Security Council, with US support, passed Resolution
487 which condemned Israel’s attack as a violation of the UN Charter. 248 Israel argued
that its attack was a justified preventive strike, but both the UN Security Council and
General Assembly disagreed.
Matters soon took a turn for the worse in Lebanon. On September 14, 1982, proIsreal Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel was assassinated by either the PLO or the
Syrians, or some combination of the two. In response, the Maronite Lebanese Front
looked to take revenge on the Palestinians living in two refugee camps in Sabra and
Shatila. The Maronite militias went on a two day killing spree, murdering hundreds of
innocent civilians while the Israeli forces turned a blind eye. 249 Lesch writes, “Anywhere
from several hundred to over a thousand largely defenseless women, children, and elderly
men were slaughtered. It was an area that was under the control of the Israelis, and it was
later concluded by an Israeli investigating body, the Kahan commission, that both
military and civilian Israeli officials were indirectly responsible.” 250 International public
opinion immediately turned against Israel, and for the first time many Israeli citizens
were angered by their government’s actions during the invasion of Lebanon. 251
These events also reflected poorly on the United States. Shannon writes,
“American reluctance to condemn the actions, coupled with the timing of a US
withdrawal of peacekeepers that the US vowed would protect Palestinians, gave the US a
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bad image in the region as well.” 252 US peacekeepers would again be deployed to restore
order in Lebanon. However, several violent terrorist attacks including the Marine
barracks bombing and Congressional pressure forced the US to withdraw it force in 1984.
United States’ support for Israel, however, continued to grow throughout the
1980s and in 1985, the United States signed its first free trade agreement with Israel. 253 In
the early 1990s the United States once again pushed for a peace in the Arab-Israeli
conflict, this time at the Madrid Conference in 1991. The conference was successful in
getting Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and a Palestinian delegation to sit down together
and discuss the issues. However, nothing substantial was agreed upon, and the conference
ended without any meaningful peace treaty. 254 Although the Madrid Conference did not
usher in a groundbreaking agreement, it did open up channels between the Israelis and
Palestinians that were previously seen as unrealistic. The Norwegians were able to
convince representatives from Israel and the Palestinians to meet in Oslo, Norway, a
secret and neutral site. 255 The two sides reached an agreement on a Declaration of
Principles that looked as if it could be a breakthrough in the peace process. Several weeks
later a signing ceremony was held on the White House lawn. Dowty writes, “The famous
photograph of hand-shake between Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat conveys some of the
undertones of the event, with US president Bill Clinton propelling an obviously reluctant
Rabin and a beaming Arafat in each other’s direction.” 256
Although the principles agreement didn’t solve every question, it did finally make
a positive step in the right direction. The United States also took a much more hands on
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approach to the implementation of the Oslo Accords. The Clinton Administration raised
money for both sides, and set the stage for Palestinian self-autonomy. 257 Within months,
Israel withdrew itself from nearly 80 percent of the Gaza strip and parts of the West
Bank. 258 Israel then signed a peace agreement with Jordan in 1994, leaving only Lebanon
and Syria as Israel’s neighbors yet to make peace with Israel.
In September of 1995, Oslo II established the Palestinian Authority (PA), an
administrative body with jurisdiction powers over 98% of the Arab population living in
Gaza and the West Bank outside of Jerusalem. 259 The first Palestinian elections were held
in January 1996, with Arafat being elected as president and his Fatah party winning a
majority of the seats in the Palestinian National Council (PNC). 260
Although the Oslo Accords appeared to have the Israelis and Palestinians heading
toward peace, religious extremists on both sides soon changed the course. Even though
Israeli Prime Minister, Rabin, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work on the
Oslo Accords, members of the religious conservative movement within Israel believed
that Rabin was conceding too much to the Palestinians. 261 Rabin was assassinated by a
religious extremist on November 4, 1995, when he was gunned down after giving a
speech on Arab-Israeli peace. 262 Hamas also damaged the peace process in early 1996
when they conducted a series of suicide bombings killing fifty-nine Israelis. New Israeli
Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, responded by suspending peace talks between Israel and
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the Palestinians. Hezbollah also participated in hurting Syrian-Israeli peace talks by
conducting rocket strikes from Lebanon against towns in Northern Israel.
The events since Rabin’s assassination hurt Peres and he was subsequently
defeated in May of 1996 by Likud’s front-runner, Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu had
vehemently opposed the Oslo Accords and disagreed with the Labor party’s “land for
peace” initiative. 263 Netanyahu’s election put a halt to the peace process. United States’
president, Bill Clinton, attempted to resuscitate the peace process in 1998 when he
brought Netanyahu and Arafat to Maryland. The two sides signed the Wye accords which
called for Israel to withdraw from 13% of the West Bank. Netanyahu angered his base by
agreeing to the land for peace initiative, and then angered his opposition by suspending
Israel’s withdraw from the West Bank. This resulted in his 1999 election loss to the
Labor party and their leader, Ehud Barak. 264
Although Barak intended on following in Rabin’s footsteps and achieving peace
with the Palestinians, religious conservative on both sides continued to make peace
difficult. Tensions continued to build in 2000 as the Clinton Administration pushed for a
peace agreement. Clinton, Barak, and Arafat met in July of 2000 in what became known
as Camp David II. Lesch writes, “The three leaders began their two weeks of meetings at
Camp David on July 11. After many long nights of discussions, threatened and actual
departures toward the airport, and a plethora of interesting ideas regarding the final status
issues floating about, the summit broke up on July 25 with no agreement.” 265
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Frustration continued to mount and reached its peak in September 2000 when the
Second Intifada or “Al-Aqsa Intifada” erupted. It still remains contested by both sides as
to why violence broke out, but the violence began when Ariel Sharon, the new Likud
party leader and former Minister of Defense, visited the Temple Mount near the al-Aqsa
mosque. This site is considered extremely holy by both Muslims and Jews, and Sharon’s
visit sparked an immediate uproar among the Palestinians. 266 Demonstrations began
immediately after his visit and the situation quickly became much more violent than the
first intifada. At first, Arafat attempted to use the intifada to his advantage, but it soon
escalated beyond his control. The PA was unable to reign in the different factions that
began to develop. The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade emerged as an offshoot of Fatah and
Palestinians began to fight themselves as well as Israelis. Lesch writes, “With the
breakdown of PA control as the al-Aqsa intifada waged on, lawlessness in the Palestinian
territories increased as bands of territorial gangs emerged to compete with the militias
and the PA itself.” 267
By the end of 2000 the intifada had claimed the lives of an estimated 41 Israelis
and 279 Palestinians. 268 The al-Aqsa intifada marked the end of the Oslo peace era.
Although the Oslo Accords achieved theoretical mutual recognition and mutual
acceptance of a two-state solution, they fell short in achieving a peace agreement between
Israel and the Palestinians. In early 2001 as Ariel Sharon achieved a landslide victory for
his Likud party. Hopes of reigniting Oslo were defeated along with Barak. Arafat’s
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effectiveness was decreasing as he was unable to control militant Islamist groups such as
Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.
Throughout the 1990s, the relationship between the United States and Israel
remained strong as the countries developed a Joint Anti-Terrorism Working Group 269 in
1996 and Israel was given access to the US satellite warning system in 1997. 270 United
States’ economic and military support remained strong up until the onset of my analysis,
which begins in 2002.

3.4 Analysis of United States’ Support for Israel from 2002-2011
With a history of United States’ support for Israel established, I now turn to the
analysis of levels of support for Israel by the United States from 2002-2011. To measure
levels of support, I apply four operational indicators: (1) the amount of Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) to Israel from the United States, (2) the economic aid given to Israel by the
United States in the form of Economic Support Funds (ESF), 271 (3) foreign trade between
the United States and Israel in the form of imports and exports, and (4) United States’
vetoes of UN Security Council resolutions against Israel. I also analyze statements from
members of the United States’ government regarding the approval or disapproval of
actions that Israel takes during the ten year time period.
Table 1 displays the four operational indicators of the United States’ support for
Israel from 2002-2011. These numbers represent US dollars in millions. The Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) and Economic Support Funds (ESF) numbers were taken directly
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from the United States Overseas Loans and Grants data which is compiled by the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) as a companion to the annual
report issued to the United States Congress. FMS and ESF numbers are not shown for
2011 because those reports have not been published yet. The Exports and Imports data
was drawn from the United States Census Bureau which publishes yearly reports. The
Exports data represents the amount the United States’ exports to Israel and the Imports
data represents the amount the United States’ imports from Israel. The Vetoes data was
taken from the Jewish Virtual Library which keeps a database of “U.S. Vetoes of UN
Resolutions Critical of Israel” from 1972 until 2011.

Table 3.1: United States Support for Israel, 2002-2011

2002
2003
2,061 3,088.60
726.7
657
7,026.70 6,892.10
12,415.70 12,768.60
1
2.00

FMS
ESF
Exports
Imports
Vetoes

United States' Support for Israel, 2002-2011
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2,165.50 2,231.40 2,257.80 2,341.70 2,381.30
2,383 2,799.50
556.9
482.2
285.8
168
44.1
40.3
36.3
9,169.10 9,737.30 10,964.80 12,887.50 14,486.90 9,559.40 11,294.40 9,766.00
14,551.50 16,830.50 19,166.80 20,794.40 22,335.80 18,744.40 20,982.40 15,571.40
2.00
0.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1
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The FMS data remains relatively stable throughout the study with a mean of
$2,412 million. The highest outlier year comes in 2002 when the United States gave
Israel $3,088.60 million. Similarly, the ESF data has a mean of $333.03 million
throughout the study, but steadily decreases each year from 2002 until 2006. After 2006
there is a huge drop in ESF that remains low for the rest of the study. The Exports data
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increases from 2003 until 2008 when it experiences a small drop. The Imports data
increases from 2002 until 2008 when it also experiences a small drop. The United States
vetoes one UN resolution in 2002; two resolutions in 2003, 2004, and 2006; and one
resolution in 2011. With the independent variable now measured, I analyze whether or
not there is a correlation between US support for Israel and public approval levels of the
United States.

Correlation of US support for Israel and Approval of United States
To test correlations between my dependent variable (regional and country by
country approval of the US) and my independent variable (US support for Israel), I ran
correlation tables in SPSS. The statistical results of the correlation tables are shown
below in Table 2. The statistical significance is measured at the .05 level. 273

Table 3.2: Regional and Country by Country Correlation Data
273

For the polling data analysis and graphs of the regional and country by country polling data see chapter
two.
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Regional and Country by Country Correlation Data
FMS
ESF
Imports

Exports

Vetoes

Regional
Pearson Correlation
Sig.

-0.443
0.232

-0.335
0.378

0.278
0.436

0.151
0.678

-0.789
0.007

Pearson Correlation
Sig.

0.014
0.971

-0.433
0.245

0.315
0.375

0.041
0.911

-0.274
0.443

Pearson Correlation
Sig.

-0.542
0.131

-0.16
0.681

0.207
0.567

0.127
0.727

-0.744
0.014

Pearson Correlation
Sig.

-0.274
0.475

-0.561
0.116

0.522
0.122

0.437
0.207

-0.831
0.003

Pearson Correlation
Sig.

-0.455
0.219

-0.143
0.713

0.104
0.776

0.026
0.944

-0.671
0.033

Pearson Correlation
Sig.

-0.043
0.913

-0.659
0.054

0.463
0.178

0.37
0.292

-0.607
0.063

Pearson Correlation
Sig.

-0.446
0.229

0.713
0.031

-0.618
0.057

-0.577
0.08

0.239
0.507

Egypt

Jordan

Lebanon

Morocco

Saudi Arabia

Turkey

Tables 6 displays a variety of different results from the correlation testing. The
bold numbers are the results that were significant at the .05 level. Turkey was the only
country that shows any significant correlation at the .05 level with United States’ ESF to
Israel. The relationship is also a positive relationship which would suggest that Turkish
approval of the United States increased along with ESF to Israel. (This is the opposite
relationship of what Hypothesis 2 predicts) The operational indicators of FMS, Imports,
and Exports did not correlate with the regional polling data or any of the country by
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country data. However, there was a significant relationship at the .05 level between US
vetoes of UN resolutions critical of Israel and the regional polling data. There was also a
strong relationship between the US vetoes and polling data from Morocco, Lebanon, and
Jordan. In all four cases the correlation data showed a negative relationship. This
suggests that approval of the US decreases as the UN vetoes occur. (This is the expected
relationship that Hypothesis 2 predicts) These results do not show a resounding
correlation between the independent and dependent variable. Similar to Chapter Two, the
correlation data does not strongly support the Hypothesis. However, I now move to the
qualitative analysis of diplomatic statements and press releases from 2002-2011 which
are cross examined with approval trends.

3.5 Analysis of Diplomatic Statements from 2002-2011
Although there is little fluctuation in my specific variables of measurement of
United States’ support for Israel, it is possible that the Middle Eastern publics respond to
diplomatic statements and press releases by the United States toward Israel. Mark Lynch
argues that “Arabs increasingly equate the United States with Israel.” 274 If this is
accurate, a military or diplomatic action by Israel could cause an increase in antiAmericanism. But what if the United States government speaks out against an action
undertaken by Israel? Could this improve the public opinion of the United States? In the
following section, I provide diplomatic statements and press releases concerning Israeli
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actions. I also address the Obama Administration’s relationship with Israel and debate if
there is any policy change concerning the United States’ support.
In 2002, the Bush Administration was critical of Israel’s decision to build a
barrier fence around the West Bank. 275 In June of 2002, members from the State
Department argued that the security fence could harm future peace negotiations. 276
President Bush commented in 2003 that “I think the wall is a problem, and I discussed
this with Ariel Sharon. It is very difficult to develop confidence between the Palestinians
and Israel … with a wall snaking through the West Bank.” 277 However, even though the
Bush Administration denounced Israel’s settlement building, it vetoed a UN Security
Council resolution calling the fence illegal under International Law. 278 The Bush
Administration was also very critical of the Israeli settlement building process. In late
2003, the Bush Administration reduced loan guarantees to Israel in an attempt to curb
settlement construction. Secretary of State, Colin Powell and other State Department
officials called on Israel to end its settlement building. 279 However, this criticism of Israel
did not boost public opinion of the United States in the Middle East. Between 2002 and
2003 regional opinion of the US dropped by 15.83%, and each of my six cases also
witnessed a drop in approval of the US from 2002 to 2003. 280 (See Chapter Two for
public opinion data and charts)
275
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The Bush Administration also attempted to foster democracy in the Palestinian
territories and began calling for elections in 2002. In a press statement, President Bush
stated, “I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders… I call upon them to build a
practicing democracy, based on tolerance and liberty. If the Palestinian people actively
pursue these goals, America and the world will actively support their efforts.” 281
Palestinian elections were held in 2006, but Hamas, whom the United States considers a
terrorist group, won in a landslide, and the Bush Administration quickly retracted its
support. 282 The United States began to funnel aid and arms to Hamas’ rivals, Fatah, and a
civil war occurred. Suzanne Goldenberg writes, “The Bush administration plan sought to
undo the results of elections in the West Bank and Gaza in January 2006 which, to the
chagrin of White House and State Department officials, saw Hamas win a majority of
seats in the Palestinian legislature.” 283 Some argue that the Bush Administration was
hypocritical when it called for democracy but refused to accept a Hamas victory. This is
similar to the argument brought up in Chapter Two that criticizes the United States for
calling for democracy in the Middle East but continuing its support for un-democratic
regimes. Stephen Walt writes, “Bush pressed the Palestinian Authority to hold legislative
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elections in 2006, but when Hamas won, he simply refused to accept the results. For
Bush, it seemed, democracy only made sense when the candidates that he liked won.” 284
In 2006, regional approval of the United States in the Middle East dropped by 9%, and in
four out of six of countries being studied. A separate public opinion poll conducted by the
Pew Research Center also shows that the publics in three of the countries being studied
overwhelming approved of the Hamas election victory. 285 Egypt showed wide support of
the Hamas victory with 76% approval, 68% of the public approved in Jordan, and 44%
approved in Turkey. 286
Another event that could have damaged approval of the United States in 2006 was
Israel’s war with Hizballah in Lebanon. The United States was seen as supporting Israel’s
attacks on Lebanon as the Bush Administration increased the amount of bombs and other
arms sent to Israel during the conflict. 287 Reports also argued that US made cluster bombs
were dropped by Israel on civilian targets in southern Lebanon. 288 The events in 2006
correlate with a significant drop in approval of US. This shows the Middle East public
can associate actions taken by Israel with how they view the United States.
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In September of 2007, Israel conducted an overnight raid in which they bombed a
suspected nuclear site in Syria. Although the Bush Administration did not officially
comment on the bombing, Glenn Kessler and Robin Wright argue that the United States
shared vital intelligence on the Syrian facility. 289 The United States Congress also
showed support for the attack when they passed a bill later that month that read
“Expressing the unequivocal support of the House of Representatives for Israel's right to
self defense in the face of an imminent nuclear or military threat from Syria.” 290
However, the support for Israel did not cause a further decrease in public opinion as the
regional approval of the United States increased by 9.3%, with four out of the six
countries being studied witnessing an increase in approval of the United States.
In December of 2008, Israel bombed and sent ground forces into the Gaza Strip
after a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas was broken. Even though most of the world
was outspokenly against the violence in Gaza 291, the United States did not condemn
Israel’s actions. The United States then blocked attempts by the UN to issue an official
statement calling for an end to the violence. 292 The Security Council finally issued a
resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire, but the United States abstained from the
vote, which showed the United States’ reluctance to call out Israel. 293 The war between
Israel and Hamas in Gaza came at a time when the Bush Administration was leaving and
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the Obama Administration was coming in. Even though the Obama Administration was
silent on the conflict which ended just days before his inauguration, the regional approval
ratings of the United States actually increased by 9.7% in 2009. Each of the six countries
being studied also witnessed increases in US approval from 2008 to 2009. However, the
Pew Research Center contends that this increase in approval occurred because Obama
was a change from the widely unpopular Bush Administration. In 2009, Obama also gave
his famous speech in Cairo aimed at the Middle East, which could have improved views
of the United States. 294
In 2010, Israeli soldiers stopped an aid flotilla called the “freedom flotilla”
heading toward Gaza. As the commandos boarded the ship they were met with resistance
and nine people aboard the ship were killed. 295 Once again, the international community
protested and condemned Israel’s actions while the Obama Administration acknowledged
Israel’s security concerns with Hamas in Gaza. 296 However, the Obama Administration
did take a stance against Israel when it opposed the new settlement building 2010. 297
However, after attempting to pressure Israel to extend its freeze on new settlements 298,
the Obama Administration gave up its demands and the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian
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peace talks were halted. 299 Views of the United States in the Middle East decreased in
2010 as regional approval dropped by 7.5% with five out of the six countries being
studied witnessing a drop in US support.
Early 2011 saw the Obama Administration veto a UN Security Council resolution
which condemned and called for an end to Israeli settlement building in the Palestinian
territories. 300 Even though the Obama Administration publicly spoke out against Israeli
settlement building in 2010, it vetoed a resolution which called settlement building illegal
and would have applied pressure to Israel. 301 President Obama raised eyebrows later in
2011 when he called for a two-state solution and claimed that “the borders of Israel and
Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure
and recognized borders are established for both states.” 302 Some in the United States
believed that the Obama Administration was turning its back on Israel 303, and Israeli
Prime Minister, Netanyahu rejected the statements and claimed that the 1967 borders are
indefensible. 304
Even though some saw this statement as a change in US policy toward Israel, it
has actually been the United States’ stance since it passed UN Security Council
Resolution 242 in 1967. The resolution called for Israel to return from territories acquired
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after the 1967 conflict. 305 Although few presidents have publicly called for this action, it
is not necessarily a change in US policy toward Israel. However, approval of the United
States continued to drop in the Middle East in 2011. Regional perceptions dropped by
another 2.3% and four out of the six countries being studies also witnessed a decrease in
approval.

Summary
In conclusion, similarly to Chapter Two my findings do not show that the
measured support of Israel has a strong correlation with approval of the United States.
Three out of the four operational indicators showed no correlation at all with one country
(Turkey) showing a positive relationship, which is not the hypothesized relationship.
However, there was strong correlation between the amount of US vetoes for Israel and
approval of the United States. This could occur because the UN vetoes are very public
indicators of US support for Israel, while the FMS, ESF, and foreign trade with Israel are
not as public and remain relatively constant throughout the ten year study. However,
there was a relationship between the press releases and public statements by the United
States and public support of the US in the Middle East. The year 2006 stands out because
Israel invaded Lebanon and the United States remained relatively quiet. The United
States also called for democratic elections in the Palestinian territory in 2006 but
relinquished this support once Hamas won. These actions correlative with an almost 10%
drop in regional approval of the US and a significant drop in four out of the six countries

305

UN.org, “Resolution 242 (1967),” http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR024094.pdf?OpenElement
103

being studied. This shows that many in the region do hold the United States accountable
for actions undertaken by Israel.
This chapter also compared the Obama and Bush Administrations’ policies
toward Israel to determine if the Obama Administration is changing its policies toward
Israel. I found that there has been little change in measured support or in diplomatic
statements toward Israel from the Obama Administration. This is apparent in a New York
Times article following President Obama’s call for Israel to return to the 1967 borders.
Kirkpatrick argues that “since those boundaries have long been the presumed baseline for
negotiations, many in the Arab world were unimpressed. Instead, they noted that he did
not call for Israel to stop building new settlements in Palestinian territory.” 306 This
suggests that many in the Middle Eastern world see the Bush and Obama
Administration’s policies toward Israel as the same. This is reflected in the polling data
which shows the Obama Administration’s approval in 2011 being lower than the last year
of the Bush Administration in 2008 in four out of the six countries being tested. These
results show that even though there is a relationship between the United States’ support
of Israel and views of the United States in the Middle East, more research must be done
on other explanations. In the following chapter, I analyze the United States’ intervention
in the domestic affairs of Middle Eastern countries and its impact of opinions of the
United States in the Middle East.
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4. Bombs, Wars, and Coups: United States’ Intervention in the Middle East
“Extensive research into the causes of suicide terrorism proves Islam isn’t to blame – the
root of the problem is foreign military occupations.”
-Robert A. Pape 307
4.1 Introduction
What is considered an intervention? Mark Amstutz writes, “Foreign intervention
involves the direct or indirect use of power to influence the affairs of other states.
Intervention can be undertaken openly or covertly, individually or collectively, and
involve relatively noncoercive actions, such as propaganda and official condemnation, to
coercive measures, ranging from economic sanctions to direct military intervention.” 308
For the purpose of this study, an intervention consists of coup attempts, military
bombings, the application of sanctions, the utilization of no-fly zones, the employment of
ground troops, and military occupations.
Does Unites States’ intervention in the Middle East affect public attitudes toward
the US? Many scholars argue that it does. Fouad Ajami contends that terrorist attacks
against the US in the 1990s such as the bombing of the Khobar towers and the attack on
the USS Cole were a direct response to the US presence in the region. 309 Robert Pape
asserts that over 95% of all suicide attacks against the United States since 1980 were a
repercussion to perceived US foreign military occupation. 310 Alfred Padros writes,
“Many Arabs in the Middle East resent the presence of non-Muslim western forces,
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which evoke memories of European colonialism.” 311 Andrew Kohut of the Pew Research
Center argues that public opinion research reveals that some of the leading causes of antiAmericanim in the Middle East are the United States’ presence in the region and United
States unilateral military actions. 312
This chapter observes Middle Eastern public opinion between 2002 and 2011
while measuring interference in domestic affairs within the Middle East by the United
States. If Hypothesis 3 (The United States’ foreign interference in domestic affairs within
the Middle East has led to an increase of negative public perceptions of the United States
in the Middle East.) is correct, levels of anti-Americanism should increase along with
increased instances of interference by the United States. This chapter recounts the history
of the United States interventions in the Middle East, an analysis of United States’
interference from 2002-2011, and a correlation test with the regional and country by
country polling data. Finally, I discuss possible policy shifts in 2011 and whether there is
such a thing as a “legitimate intervention.” I also analyze any affect this could have on
Middle Eastern public opinion.

Legitimate Intervention?
The question of whether all interventions spawn negative public views of the
United States is addressed throughout this chapter. First, I address whether the United
States’ historical interventions are legitimate in the eyes of those living in the Middle
East. Legitimate interventions are accepted by a majority of those living in the Middle
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East and cause much less anti-Americanism than illegitimate interventions. I am not
looking at whether this intervention was legitimate in the eyes of Americans or the
broader international community. I am looking at how the average Middle Eastern citizen
views the historical and present day US interventions. This is by no means a perfect test
because like any society, the Middle East is a very diverse region with many conflicting
points of view. I am merely attempting to gauge how the majority of those living in the
Middle East view US interventions. Legitimate interventions don’t necessarily need to
invoke a positive image of the United States, however they must not cause an
increasingly negative image. The labels “legitimate” or “illegitimate” do not represent the
success of the intervention itself. Instead, they represent the type of sentiment felt by the
larger Middle Eastern community. Andrew Hurrell claims that legitimacy is mutual
acceptance based on international law. 313 Inis Claude argues that legitimacy is achieved
when states work through international organizations such as the UN. 314 Louis Henkin
agrees when he contends that no state shall threaten or use force against any other
independent state as mandated in the UN Charter. 315 Amstutz cites the Just War Theory
as a source for debating whether interventions or wars are legitimate. A “just war” must
satisfy two norms: 1) Justice of going to war, and 2) Justice in wartime. 316 Amstutz
contends that a “just war” must be undertaken as a last resort measure to restore peace
and must have limited objectives and receive the proper authority while not targeting
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non-combatants. 317 Since unilateral interventions violate state sovereignty and territorial
integrity which is against international law, Amstutz argues that these interventions are
almost never justified. 318 However, in 2005 the UN reviewed state sovereignty and
declared that states have the responsibility to protect. This means that states sovereignty
can be overridden if a state is not preventing genocides, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity. 319 Although this process is still to be facilitated by the UN and
is thus multilateral by nature. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, legitimate
interventions must 1) be multilateral, 2) be facilitated by an international organization, 3)
not violate international law, and 4) discriminate between combatants and noncombatants.

4.2 History of United States’ Interventions in the Middle East
Prior to World War II, the United States had minimal interest and had not
intervened in Middle Eastern affairs. The European colonial powers of Britain and France
were distrusted and disliked by many in the Middle East, but the United States was seen
as an isolationist power that respected people’s right to self-determination. 320 The United
States launched military campaigns in North Africa and set up military bases throughout
the Middle East during World War II, but its presence in the region was accepted and not
viewed negatively by many in the Middle East. Rashid Khalidi writes, “The arrival of a
‘new’ great power with an anticolonialist tradition, and which although allied to Britain
and France did not appear to share their imperialist ambitions, was welcomed by
317
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many.” 321 However, after World War II, the United States’ position in the Middle East
took a sharp turn. The United States’ relationship with Israel, the emerging Cold War,
and increased interest in oil made the Middle East a vital region to keep away from the
Soviet Union. The fear of Soviet encroachment led to interventionist policies which
included: coups, covert operations, bombings, wars, and occupations. In the following
section, I go over the history of these interventionist policies up until my study begins in
2002. I begin by discussing indirect uses of power which come in the forms of coups and
covert action. I then move on to discussing more direct uses of force which include
military bombings and the use of ground troops.

Indirect Intervention: Coups and Covert Action
Indirect interventions are private use of force that excludes the declared use of the
US military. Indirect interventions are usually preformed covertly and could range from
using propaganda to affect political outcomes inside a country, funding a rebel group
within a country, or arming an opposition group within a country. Indirect interventions
could be used to threaten a state or could also be used to cause a political coup. The use
of predator drones is an indirect intervention because it is not public knowledge and is
usually preformed covertly.
Syria was one of the first countries the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) saw as strategically important in the Middle East. It shared a border with two US
allies in Israel and Turkey. Syria had a very active communist party, which the United
States feared could move the country closer to the Soviets. Furthermore, Syria was
located in an area that was strategically important to the flow of Middle Eastern oil.
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Douglas Little writes, “Because it stood athwart the pipelines carrying Persian Gulf oil to
the Mediterranean, an unpredictable Syria could suddenly halt the flow of petroleum
upon which Western European economic recovery depended.” 322 The United States was
apprehensive that a Soviet-friendly regime could cause problems for Israel, Turkey, and
their allies in Western Europe. However, the United States also believed that direct
military involvement would only add fuel to the fire; therefore covert action seemed to be
the logical solution. 323 Mark Lowenthal defines covert actions as “an activity or activities
of the United States government to influence political, economic or military conditions
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be
apparent or acknowledged publicly.” 324
After violent anti-American protests erupted in Syria in late 1948, Syrian’s Prime
Minister Mardam resigned, and the CIA believed it was necessary to intervene. In early
1949, CIA agents met secretly with Syrian right-wing army officers and constructed a
coup in which Chief of Staff, Husni Zaim, would take power. 325 Zaim was strongly antiSoviet and was open to US military assistance and improving relations with Israel. The
coup worked without bloodshed and Zaim took power and was soon formally recognized
by the United States. 326 However, within months a second coup was enacted and Zaim
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was killed. A third coup occurred months later and Syria’s government was in
disarray. 327
The United States established close ties with Adib Shishakli, the military leader
who took power after multiple regime changes. Shishakli agreed to accept Palestinian
refugees and improved relations with Israel in exchange for financial and military aid
from the United States. 328 However, by 1954 the Syrian army orchestrated another coup
which toppled the Shishakli regime. Fearing a takeover by the anti-American Baath party,
the CIA orchestrated several plots along with British and Turkish intelligence for
Shishakli to take back power in 1956-7. 329 Little writes, “The original CIA-SIS plan
appears to have called for Turkey to stage border incidents, British operatives to stir up
the desert tribes, and American agents to mobilize SSNP (Syrian Social Nationalist Party)
guerillas, all of which would trigger a pro-Western coup.” 330 However the coup attempts
were poorly organized and Syrian intelligence was able to uncover multiple plots. 331
Many CIA agents fled the country as their assets were arrested and the US embassy was
put under surveillance. 332
The United States spent almost a decade intervening in and attempting to
influence Syrian affairs. However, the CIA plots were largely a failure because they
increased anti-Americanism and pushed Syria closer to the Soviets. The anti-American
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sentiment eventually led to a Ba’ath regime led by Hafiz al-Assad. 333 His son, Bashar alAssad, still holds power today, and the regime remains vehemently anti-American. The
policy of covert action was a new foreign policy strategy at this time, and the CIA
believed it could still improve these covert tactics. The United States attempted to perfect
the art of covert action in Iran in 1953.
The Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad Mossadeq, was democratically elected by
the Iranian people in 1951. That same year Mossadeq nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company (AIOC) which the United Kingdom had owned the rights to since 1901. 334 This
move was strongly supported by the Iranian people who wanted to see some of the profit
from their country’s natural resource. Cook and Roshandel writes, “The Western world,
most importantly the United States and United Kingdom, was frustrated at the time by the
lack of cooperation they were receiving from the democratically elected Premier of Iran,
Mohammad Mossadeq. At the heart of the issue was Iranian oil.” 335 The United States
was also concerned because Mossadeq had threatened that Iran may turn to the Soviets
for economic aid. Peter Hahn asserts, “Although the Iranian leader was not a Communist,
Mossadegh was apparently becoming dependent on the local Communist (Tudeh) Party
for political support, making his threat to turn to Moscow for aid troubling.” 336 The
United States feared that Mossadeq sympathized with the Soviet Union, and might
possibly ally Iran with their Communist adversaries. CIA historian, William Blum writes,
“John Foster Dulles… saw in Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh the epitome of all that he
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detested in the Third World: unequivocal neutralism in the cold war, tolerance of
Communists, and disrespect for free enterprise, as demonstrated by the oil
nationalization.” 337 The fear that Mossadeq was friendly to Communists, Iran’s
exceeding amount of oil, and the fact that Iran shared a large border with the Soviet
Union, all played factors in the Eisenhower’s administration’s decision to stage a coup.
This planned coup was called Operation AJAX, and was enacted by the CIA. The
developers of the plan were Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, and director of the
CIA (who also happened to be his brother), Allen Dulles. John Ranelagh writes “The
operation was essentially formulated by the Dulles brothers, working together, on June
25, 1953, at a meeting in John Foster Dulles’ office in the State Department.” 338 Kermit
Roosevelt, the head of the CIA’s Middle East Division was put in charge of Operation
AJAX. Roosevelt enacted a Covert Action that included a propaganda campaign against
Mossadeq and political activity such as bribing senior parliamentary and military officials
to support the coup. The goal was to convince the Iranian public that Mossadeq was
planning on deposing the Shah of Iran, who had relatively little power at this time. 339
Once this was accomplished, Mossadeq would be arrested and the Shah would be able to
take over full control of the country. The CIA started by convincing the Shah to go along
with this scheme. Blum writes, “The first step was to reassure the Shah that Eisenhower
and Churchill were behind him in his struggle for power with Mossadegh and were
willing to provide whatever military and political support he needed.” 340 This strategy
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worked and the Shah then issued his royal decree which dismissed Mossadeq as prime
minister on August 16, 1953. When Mossadeq received notice of the decree, he publicly
declared that only the parliament could dismiss him and that he would not step down. 341
The CIA then distributed copies of the decree throughout Tehran to garner support for the
Shah. Iranians had also been recruited to bribe military officials to support the Shah. On
August 19, the CIA’s Iranian agents staged a parade showing support for the Shah that
marched throughout Tehran. Blum states, “The CIA engaged in heavy bribery of
members of parliament and other influential Iranians to enlist their support against the
prime minister.” 342 The plan had worked and the public began to support the parade.
“The marchers were waving banners, shouting ‘Long live the Shah!’”, Blum writes,
“Along the edges of the procession, men were passing out Iranian currency adorned with
a portrait of the Shah.” 343
It had looked as if the coup might succeed without any bloodshed. However, there
were still large amounts of Iranians who were not bought out or convinced by the parade.
Mossadeq supporters stormed the streets of Tehran and a nine-hour battle broke out in
which over 300 people were killed and hundreds more were wounded. Finally, that
evening the fighting ended and the Mossadeq supporters surrendered. 344 Although
Mossadeq was arrested and the fighting ended, many Iranians still expressed confusion
and hatred toward the Shah and the United States. “A few days later,” Blum writes, “at
least 100,000 people filled the streets of Teheran to express strong anti-US and anti-Shah
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sentiments.” 345 After the Shah took power, the National Iranian Oil Company was
founded and the United States and United Kingdom both held a 40 percent share of the
new company. This meant that two outside countries now possessed 80 percent of Iran’s
oil wealth. 346
The CIA backed coup was seen a huge success at the time by the United States,
however, no one predicted the blow back that it would later evoke. The coup not only
compelled Iranians to distrust the United States, but it also severely damaged the United
States’ reputation throughout the Middle East. Cook and Roshandel write, “This U.S.
involvement in the coup continues to serve as an important reminder to Iranians, and
many in the Middle East, that the United States is more interested in protecting its own
interests than promoting democracies.” 347 Policy makers and the intelligence community
finally realized the repercussions of the coup in 1979 when an Islamic revolution
occurred and ousted the Shah. 348 The revolution was followed by a hostage crisis which
further damaged US-Iranian relations, and the relationship between these two countries
continues to be strained to this day.
Following a pattern of US involvement in the Middle East, the CIA intervened in
Iraq because of access to oil and Cold War fears. As was mentioned in Chapter Three, the
Iraqi Free Officers overthrew the pro-British Hashemite family in a coup in 1958. Abd alKarim Qasim took over as Prime Minister, and the United States was immediately fearful
that Qasim would ally himself with the Soviet Union. 349 The United States was also
apprehensive about the possibility of being cut off from Iraqi oil reserves. Barry Lando
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argues that the CIA was unsuccessful in assassinating Qasim in October of 1959, only a
year after he took power. 350 It was at this time, Lando comments, when the CIA
developed ties to Saddam Hussein and the anti-Communist Baath Party. 351
The United States saw the Baath Party as a viable alternative to the communist
leaning Qasim government. Qasim further alarmed the United States in 1961, when he
attempted to create an Iraqi national oil company and purchased arms from the Soviets to
suppress the Kurdish uprising. 352 The United States intervened with a CIA plot to
overthrow Qasim in February of 1963. Lando writes, “Several army units, supported by
the Baath and the CIA, rose in revolt, and by February 9 the unpopular president was a
prisoner in his own palace, deserted by most of his former allies. Qasim was summarily
tried and condemned to death.” 353 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett further assert “it is certain
that some of the Ba’th leaders were in touch with American intelligence networks, and it
is also undeniable that a variety of different groups in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle
East had a strong vested interest in breaking what was probably the strongest and most
popular Communist Party in the region.” 354
Similar to Iran, the Iraqi coup was seen by the United States as a major success.
The CIA footprint was extremely small, and a pro-Soviet regime was toppled. However,
following the coup, Iraq witnessed a significant anti-US backlash because the Baath Party
enacted a series of brutal killings, tortures, and arrests of members of the former
government and Communist Party. Saddam Hussein was put in charge of the killings, and
Lando argues that he participated in the tortures “by pumping water into their bodies,
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breaking their bones, and electrocuting them.” 355 Not only did Hussein kill hundreds of
suspected communists, but he became a leading member of the Baath party and President
of Iraq in 1979. 356 The United States would later intervene against Saddam Hussein in
1991 and 2003.

Direct Intervention: Military Bombings, Wars, and Occupations
Direct interventions are public use of force by the United States. These
interventions are usually apparent to the international community while indirect
interventions are often more secretive. Direct interventions can come in the form of allout war between the United States and another country or military bombing of a country
by the United States. The use of US ground troops also signifies a direct intervention.
The United States further strengthened its role in the Middle East in 1957 with the
Eisenhower doctrine, which pledged US aid or military forces to a country being
threatened by outside elements. This doctrine was aimed at keeping Soviet influence out
of the Middle East by maintaining the status quo. The situation in Lebanon began to
deteriorate following the Suez Crisis in 1956, when Lebanon’s Christian president,
Camille Chamoun, refused to break diplomatic ties with Israel, France, and Britain.
Chamoun found himself at odds with Egyptian President Nasser, a staunch advocate of
Arab nationalism. 357 Tensions arose when Chamoun intended to seek illegally another
term as president. Blum writes, “The inordinate pro-American orientation of Chamoun’s
government and his refusal to dispel rumors that he would seek a second term incensed

355

Lando, Web of Deceit, 30.
Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 208-9.
357
Charles Winslow, Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society, (London: Routledge, 1996) 107.
356

117

both Lebanese nationalists and advocates of Arab nationalism.” 358 This spawned a
sectarian clash between Lebanon’s large Christian and Muslim populations.
The violence continued and eventually erupted into an all-out civil war in May of
1958, against anti-government rebels consisting mostly of Muslims but also some
Christians who were unhappy with Chamoun’s rule. Agnes Korbani writes, “Unrest
began when a majority of Muslims and a minority of Christians attempted to overthrow
Chamoun. This effort was undertaken with the assistance of outside forces, especially
forces from neighboring Syria.” 359 Chamoun, with his government on the verge of
collapse, called on the United States for military assistance.
Even though the Soviet Union was not involved in the Lebanese civil war,
Chamoun was able to convince the United States that there was a communist threat from
the Soviet leaning United Arab Republic. 360 The United States enacted Operation Blue
Bat, which put nearly 15,000 troops on the ground in Beirut. The objective was not to
take part in the war, but instead to make sure that the Syrian did not invade. 361 When it
became obvious that Syria had no intention of intervening, the objective shifted to ending
the violence. The United States was successful in staying out of military confrontations
with the rebels, and within several months the American forces were withdrawn. 362
Chamoun served out the rest of his term, which ended in September of 1958. The
United States arranged meetings between the two sides and a coalition government was
formed with members of the rebel group. The United States’ intervention was largely a
success, as it prevented further violence and did not cause an anti-American backlash.
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Winslow writes, “It became apparent to many Lebanese that the Americans had not come
to do Chamoun’s bidding. Nor had they intervened to guarantee Christian control of the
state as the Phalangists had hoped.” 363 However, the situation in Lebanon would not
remain stable which led to the United State intervening in Lebanon again in 1982.
The Reagan Administration had a series of military interventions in the Middle
East during the 1980s. They began with the Lebanon intervention in 1982. After the
United States’ intervention in Lebanon in 1958, Lebanon experienced a short period of
stability. However, tensions began to rise once again in the mid-1970s as the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) relocated to Lebanon. The PLO destabilized the country
by arming the large Palestinian refugee population in Southern Lebanon. 364 In response,
Christian militias began to form, and Lebanese society began to fragment once again
along sectarian lines. This ultimately led to civil war in 1975 and multiple interventions
from outside forces including Syria, Israel, and the United States.
The United States, under President Ronald Reagan, decided to intervene in
August of 1982, following an Israeli invasion several months earlier. Israel had invaded
with goals of removing the PLO, containing the Syrians, and leaving Lebanon under
Christian control. 365 The United States sent in a multi-national peace keeping force
approved by the United Nations to oversee the removal of the PLO and establish peace
between the different political and religious factions. 366 The American force immediately
began to oversee the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon, and by early September the
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United States began to draw down its forces. 367 However, just when it seemed as if the
violence had subsided, newly elected President Bashir Gemayel was assassinated, and
matters took a turn for the worse. Gemayel’s supporters immediately looked to take
revenge on the Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps which were overseen
by the Israelis. 368 Estimates vary, but Winslow writes, “Nearly 2,000 people were killed,
mostly women, children, and the elderly.” 369 The massacre instantly drew the United
States back in to Lebanon, and nearly 1,400 marines were deployed. 370
Although the United States’ led multinational force was to remain neutral and
establish peace, the marines engaged in combat against anti-government Druze and Shiah
militias on several occasions. The United States’ forces increasingly met resistance from
the Syrian backed Druze and Palestinian forces opposed to the Maronite government and
Israel occupation. This resistance culminated on October 23, 1983, when a suicide
bomber denoted a truck bomb in the US Marine barracks killing 241 American
servicemen. 371 This was the largest blow to the US military in a single day since Pearl
Harbor, and it was a realization of the anti-Americanism caused by United States’
presence in the region. By 1984, the United States began to draw down its forces in
Lebanon, and the last Marines left the country in February of 1984. However, peace was
not established as violence continued between Lebanon and anti-government factions
until the Taif Agreement of 1989. The Reagan Administration turned to the use of
military bombings in its dispute with Libya.
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Tensions between Libya and the United States emerged in the first year of Ronald
Reagan’s presidency. Libyan President, Muammar al-Qaddafi made his distaste for the
United States apparent in 1981 when he “proclaimed his support for Iran’s struggle
against ‘the Great Satan’ and instructed a mob to burn down the U.S. embassy in
Tripoli.” 372 The Reagan Administration responded to the embassy burning by banning
Libyan oil exports and closing the Libyan People’s Bureau. Qaddafi then attempted to
challenge United States’ ships docked in the Mediterranean with Soviet SU-22 fighter
jets, which were subsequently shot down by American navy pilots. 373 This interchange
was successful in deterring Qaddafi for a short while, but several years later the two sides
clashed once again.
Instead of directly confronting the US military, Qaddafi began a campaign of
supporting terrorism against American soldiers and tourists across Europe. A TWA jet
carrying American passengers to Greece was bombed, and a West Berlin night club was
also hit killing two American servicemen. 374 The CIA confirmed that Libyan Intelligence
had been behind the attacks, and the Reagan Administration believed it was time to
respond. Operation El Dorado Canyon was quickly approved and on April 15, 1986,
dozens of F-111 and F-16 jets dropped over sixty tons of explosives on Tripoli and
Benghazi. 375 The bombings destroyed the Libyan air force and leveled Qaddafi’s house,
killing dozens of civilians including Qaddafi’s adopted daughter. 376
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Although the operation was unsuccessful in killing Qaddafi, it was seen as a
success by the Reagan Administration. Many in the Administration believed that the use
of US airpower was superior to placing boots on the ground as they did in Lebanon, and
that this was a “textbook example of successful intervention.” 377 It also appeared that
Qaddafi was successfully deterred from attacking the United States. However, in
December of 1988 he struck again, when Libyan operatives placed a bomb on a Pan Am
flight, which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing thirty-seven Americans. 378 The
United States employed its most heavy handed intervention in Iraq beginning in 1991.
United States’ relations were never remarkably close with Iraq. Although the
United States did give weapons and military training to Iraq throughout the 1980s (as
mentioned in Chapter two), this was done as a counter to Iran. Even though the Cold War
was coming to a close at the beginning of the 1990s, Iraq had historically leaned closer to
the Soviets than it did to the United States. Iraq also opposed the United States’ position
in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which put a strain on US-Iraqi relations. However, the United
States’ relationship with Iraq went from bad to worse on August 2, 1990, when Iraq
invaded neighboring Kuwait. 379 Tyler writes, “Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait had
blindsided Washington. On August 2, hundreds of Iraqi tanks crashed across the border
and soon were rolling through the fashionable shopping districts of Kuwait city.” 380
The United States responded by amassing a United Nations sponsored
international coalition to counter Iraq. The coalition included Britain, France, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and Syria, and the United Nations Security Council approved a resolution
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which allowed the use of force against Iraq. 381 Operation Desert Storm launched January
17, 1991, and its purpose was to remove Iraq from Kuwait. The war began with an
extremely successful air campaign, and continued with a ground assault by coalition
forces. Oren writes, “Charging into Kuwait and southern Iraq, armored and infantry
formations outflanked and slaughtered Saddam’s supposedly elite Republican Guards and
demolished his tank divisions.” 382 The United States led coalition was able to liberate
Kuwait in a matter of days, and decided not to press further into Iraq and topple Saddam.
By March, the coalition forces began to withdraw from Kuwait.
American civilians and the US government saw the Gulf War as a resounding
victory and show of US military power. However, even though the coalition consisted of
a broad alliance between US, European, and Middle Eastern countries, many Islamists in
the Middle East were outraged over the US presence in Saudi Arabia during and after
Operation Desert Storm. Oren writes, “More venomous still was resentment aroused in
the Arab mujahideen, including a still obscure Osama bin Laden, who had finally driven
the Soviet unbelievers from Afghanistan only to find American infidels bivouacked near
Mecca and Medina.” 383 This became a leading cause of anti-American sentiment
espoused by Al Qaeda that built in the 1990s and culminated on September 11, 2001.
Following the Gulf War, the United States instilled no fly zones in Northern and
Southern Iraq to protect the Kurds in the North and Shiah of the South who had rebelled
against Saddam. The United Nations Security Council also imposed debilitating
economic and trade sanctions on Iraq that began when Iraq invaded Kuwait and lasted
until the United States toppled Saddam’s regime in 2003. The Clinton Administration
381
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also ordered air strikes on Iraq in 1993 and 1998 following Iraq’s refusal to comply with
United Nations nuclear inspectors. 384 These interventions throughout the 1990s were also
a source of anti-Americanism because many argued that they were debilitating to the
Iraqi citizens which had nothing to do with the Saddam regime. 385 It reduced Iraq’s
exports, damaged the civilian infrastructure, and crippled Iraq’s public sector. 386

Summary
This history of US intervention in the Middle East began with a covert approach
that kept the US less directly involved in Middle Eastern affairs. US intervention
increased and gradually became more involved including deployments of troops and
bombing campaigns. This culminated with the first US war in the Middle East in Iraq in
1991. This history sets the stage for US intervention between 2002 and 2011. The Iraq
War of 2003-2011 and the Libya intervention of 2011 are foreshadowed by a history of
the United States using soldiers, bombs, and coups to promote its interests in the Middle
East. I now turn to the analysis of the United States’ historical interventions as “good” or
“bad” interventions.

Legitimate Interventions
Based on the criteria mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, I classify the
United States’ historical interventions as either “legitimate” or “illegitimate”
interventions. The historical interventions that I found to be “illegitimate” were the
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successful coups and coup attempts in Syria, Iran, and Iraq. These three interventions
were all performed covertly and unilaterally. They were not facilitated by any
international organizations or the country itself which resulted in a violation of state
sovereignty in all three cases. The military interventions in Lebanon in 1958 and in Libya
in 1986 are also considered “illegitimate” interventions. In both cases the United States
unilaterally intervened without the approval of the UN or any other international
organizations. In the case of Libya, the United States was condemned by a UN
Resolution which claimed that the United States violated the UN Charter and
International Law. 387 The interventions in Lebanon in 1982 and in Iraq in 1991 are
considered “legitimate” because they both consisted of a multilateral coalition that
received authority from the UN and the international community. The intervention in
Lebanon consisted of a coalition that included the United States, France, Italy and the
United Kingdom. The intervention was also approved by the United Nations Interim
Force in Lebanon which sought to restore peace and oversee the expulsion of the PLO. 388
Similarly the intervening force in Iraq consisted of a very broad international coalition
that included regional states such as Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. 389 This intervention was also approved and
facilitated by the UN. 390 Amstutz also applied the Just War Theory to the Persian Gulf
War and discovered similar findings. The war satisfied all six of the criteria needed to go
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to war, and the criteria for justice in wartime. 391 This is further evidence that the Iraq
intervention in 1991 should be considered a “legitimate” intervention. I now turn to the
analysis of US interventions in the Middle East from 2002 until 2011.

4.3 Analysis of United States’ Interventions in the Middle East from 2002-2011
I now turn to the analysis of US interventions in the Middle East from 2002 to
2011. This variable will be measured using six operational indicators: (1) the number of
ground troops deployed within the country in question by the United States or forces
including the United States, (2) the number of civilian casualties caused by the United
States within country in question, (3) the presence of economic sanctions put forth
through the United Nations on country in question by the United States or unilaterally by
the United States, (4) the installment of a no-fly zone by the United States, (5) the
presence of military bombings on country in question by the United States or forces
including the United States, and (6) the use of US predator drones in country in question.
These six operational indicators are displayed below in Table 1.

Table 4.1: Operational Indicators from 2002-2011
Troops
Casualties
Sanctions
No-Fly Zones
Bombings
Predator Drones

2002
0
0
Iraq
Iraq
none
Yemen

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
67,700 130,600 143,800 141,100 148,300 157,800 135,600
88,300
42,800
12,102
11,361
15,755
28,589
25,130
9,407
4,741
4,053
4,159
Iraq
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 Libya/Syria
Iraq
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 Libya
Iraq
Iraq
Iraq
Iraq
Iraq
Iraq
Iraq
Iraq
Iraq/Libya
0
0
0
0
0
0 Yemen Yemen Yemen
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Table 1 displays operational indicators (1) through (6) of US interventions in the
Middle East from 2002-2011. Troop levels and civilian casualties are both represented by
numbers for each year. Sanctions and no-fly zones are all represented by country they
were present in, or “0” if they did not occur in that year in any Middle Eastern country.
Because the amount of military bombings and predator strikes are classified by the US
government, these indicators are also represented by country they were present in, or “0”
if they did not occur in that year. Numbers of casualties represent civilian casualties in
Iraq from 2003 until 2010. In 2011, the number (4,159) is the sum of civilian casualties in
Iraq (4,087) and in Libya (72). The civilian casualty numbers for Iraq were derived from
Iraq Body Count, an organization which gives records of documented civilian deaths
which is supplemented by NGOs, media coverage, official records, and hospital and
morgue records. 393 The civilian casualty numbers for the 2011 Libyan intervention were
taken from Human Rights Watch. 394 The numbers for troop levels in Iraq from 2003 to
2011 were supplied by the Congressional Research Service’s annual report to
Congress. 395
Troop levels in Iraq begin at 67,700 in 2003. These numbers steadily increase
each year until they reach their peak at 157,800 in 2008. The numbers then decline from
2009 to 2011 when they’re at their lowest at 42,800. Civilian casualty figures begin at
12,102 in 2003. They slightly dip in 2004 at 11,361, and then steadily increase from 2004
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until 2006 at 28,589. Casualties make substantial decreases after 2006, reaching their
lowest point in 2010 at 4,053. The sanctions data begins with sanctions on Iraq in 2002
and 2003 prior to the US invasion. These sanctions are lifted after the Saddam regime
falls and are not applied to Iraq again throughout the study. Sanctions appear in 2011 on
both Syria and Libya following their human rights’ abuses during the “Arab Spring.” 396
Similarly to sanctions, a no-fly zone was enforced in Iraq in 2002 and 2003 prior to the
US invasion. A no-fly zone was also instilled in Libya during the NATO campaign in
2011. Bombing campaigns took place in Iraq from 2003 to 2011, and also occurred in
Libya in 2011. However, the volume of bombing is classified and could not be included
in the study. Similarly the number and existence of predator drone strikes is also
classified, but news reports suggest that predator strikes occurred in Yemen beginning in
2002 and occurring again from 2009 to 2011. 397

Correlation of US Interventions in the Middle East and Approval of the United States
To test correlations between my dependent variable (regional and country by
country approval of the US) and my independent variable (US intervention in the Middle
East), I ran correlation tables on two of my operational indicators in SPSS. Troop levels
and number of casualties were the only quantifiable operational indicators which could be
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correlation tested. The statistical results of the correlation tables are shown below in
Table 2. The statistical significance is measured at the .05 level. 398

Table 4.2: Regional and Country by Country Correlation Data

398

For the polling data analysis and graphs of the regional and country by country polling data see chapter
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Table 2 shows that neither the regional perceptions nor country by country
perceptions have a relevant correlation with troop levels or civilian casualty numbers at
the .05 level. Although there isn’t a statistical correlation between regional and country
by country levels of anti-Americanism and troop levels and number of civilian casualties,
this does not mean that Hypothesis 3 is inaccurate. Statistical analysis of US interventions
does not go far enough; therefore a qualitative analysis is also required. Levels of antiAmerican sentiment may not correlate statistically with troop levels and casualties, but
the mere presence of US forces in the Middle East may be enough to increase antiAmerican sentiment. This is shown below in Table 3.
Table 3 displays levels of approval of the US prior to and after the US
intervention in Iraq and the US intervention in Libya. In both cases there is a drop in
approval of the US. However the largest and most significant difference occurs between
2002 and 2003 when the United States invaded Iraq. The regional witnesses a 15.83%
drop in approval of the US in just one year, and every country except Egypt and Turkey
witness their lowest approval ratings of the ten year study. Jordan and Morocco also
witness their largest decrease in US approval of the ten year study, with both deceasing
by 24%. The intervention in Libya did not cause nearly as much disapproval of the US as
the intervention in Iraq did. The region witnessed a 2.33% drop in approval of the US
with four out of the six countries experiencing a drop in approval of the US except for
Lebanon, which stayed the same, and Saudi Arabia which increased by 6%. This
difference between interventions could be based on the type of intervention. For example,
the intervention in Libya was of a much smaller scale and did not include the use of
ground forces by the US. The intervention in Libya was also facilitated by the UN and
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approved by states in the international community, while the intervention in Iraq did not
go through the UN and was seen as a unilateral use of force by many in the international
community. 399 Many in the Middle East also supported the US efforts in Libya including
the Arab League, which was not the case in Iraq in 2003. 400

Table 4.3: US Intervention and Anti-American Levels

Egypt
Jordan
Lebanon
Morocco
Saudi Arabia
Turkey
Regional Totals

2003 Intervention in Iraq
2002
2003 Difference
15
13
-2
27
3
-24
34
19
-15
30
6
-24
14
4
-10
35
15
-20
25.83
10
-15.83

2011 Intervention in Libya
2010
2011 Difference
15
12
-2
19
11
-8
36
36
0
14
12
-2
24
30
6
17
10
-7
20.83
18.5
-2.33

Is there such thing as a “legitimate intervention” in the Middle East? As was
discussed earlier in this Chapter, some interventions are more accepted than others. The
qualitative analysis of US intervention also reflects this as the Iraq intervention in 2003
saw a much more significant increase in anti-Americanism than the 2011 intervention in
Libya did. The history of US intervention reveals that some interventions were accepted
by many in the international community, while others caused a sense of distrust among
many in the Middle East. The 2003 war in Iraq only served to reinforce this distrust.
Because the 2011 intervention in Libya was called for and supported by the Arab League,
399

Eyal Benvenisti, “The US and the Use of Force: Double-edged Hegemony and the Management of
Global Emergencies,” European Journal of International Law 15 (no. 4, 2004).
400
Ethan Bronner and David Sanger, “Arab League Endorses No-Flight Zone Over Libya,” New York
Times (March 12, 2011)
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/13/world/middleeast/13libya.html?pagewanted=all
131

the UN, and many in the international community, the broader Middle Eastern population
could have seen this intervention as much more legitimate than the intervention in Iraq.
This indicates that the United States can prevent large scale anti-Americanism by limiting
intervention and scaling back the level of US presence in the region. Decreasing the use
of ground troops and looking to international organizations such as the UN and the Arab
League can prevent the type of anti-American upheaval witnessed after the US invaded
Iraq in 2003. This type of intervention could be considered a “legitimate intervention”
because it doesn’t create the blowback that could occur from a mishandled intervention.
This is also reflected in the history of US intervention in the Middle East. The Gulf War
in Iraq in 1991 did not initially cause much anti-American backlash, but the fact that US
troops remained in Saudi Arabia after the war did cause a significant amount of antiAmericanism.

Summary
In conclusion, even though statistical correlations weren’t found, there still is
evidence that US interventions have a causal relationship with anti-Americanism in the
Middle East. The correlations tests could only be performed on troop levels and civilian
casualties, and neither showed a significant relationship with anti-Americanism.
However, the US intervention in Iraq which began in 2003 did correlate with a significant
drop in approval of the US by each of the countries in my study. The regional average of
US approval decreased by over 25%. Approval of the US did decrease when the US
intervened in Libya in 2011. However, this time the decrease was much smaller than in
2003 and two out of the six countries did not witness a decrease in approval of the US.
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Unlike the intervention in Iraq in 2003, the intervention in Libya was called on by the
UN, the Arab League, and most of the international community. The United States did
not use ground troops and instead relied on a broad UN coalition for air strikes and
monetary and military support for the rebel groups. The intervention only lasted months
as control was swiftly given to the transitional government in Libya. Further research
should address which groups within the Middle Eastern population respond more
negatively to US intervention. Do militants respond negatively to all types of US
intervention? Does level of religiosity affect one’s views of US intervention? These
questions should be addressed in future research. The intervention in Libya is an
example of a “legitimate intervention” in which the US witnessed much lower increases
of anti-Americanism. The difference in these two interventions and the different reactions
by the Middle Eastern publics shows there is a causal relationship and that there are more
effective ways to intervene.
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5. Conclusion: Explaining anti-Americanism in the Middle East
“Hostility toward the United States in the broader society plays a critical role in
sustaining terrorist groups, even if most disapprove of those groups’ tactics. The
essential ‘problem,’ then, is one of America’s relationship with Muslim societies as a
whole, or an integrated system.”
-Steven Kull 401
5.1 Introduction
Anti-Americanism in the Middle East remains a significant topic for US policy
makers, those studying terrorism, and general scholars of the Middle East. What leads
ordinary people to support or participate in terrorist attacks against the United States?
Steven Kull writes, “The problem of terrorism does not simply lie in the small number of
people who join terrorist organizations. Rather, the existence of terrorist organizations is
a symptom of tension in the larger society that finds a particular virulent expression in
certain individuals.” 402 Clark McCauly agrees when he claims that terrorist groups are at
the “apex of a pyramid of supporters and sympathizers. The base of the pyramid is
composed of all those who sympathize with the terrorist cause even though they may
disagree with the violent means that the terrorist use.” 403 This societal support is fueled
by the causes of anti-Americanism discussed throughout this study. The literature reveals
that the two are interconnected and result from a disapproval of US foreign policy within
the region. What specific policies induce the largest increases in anti-Americanism? Will
reversing these policies alleviate this hostility toward the United States? What can policy
makers do to preserve US interests in the region while decreasing anti-Americanism? Or,
is this possible?
401
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This final chapter (1) assesses the four hypotheses presented in chapter one using
empirical data found in chapters two, three, and four; (2) develops a theory on the
correlation between US foreign policy and anti-Americanism in the Middle East; (3)
gives policy recommendations to the United States government regarding antiAmericanism and US foreign policy in the Middle East; and (4) concludes with
recommendation on further research.

5.2 Analyzing the Hypotheses
This section assesses the four hypotheses that were drawn from the literature on
anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Each hypothesis is applied to the six cases of (1)
Egypt, (2) Jordan, (3) Lebanon, (4) Morocco, (5) Saudi Arabia, and (6) Turkey during the
time period of 2002 to 2011. Each hypothesis will be analyzed and rejected or fail to be
rejected based on the available empirical data.

(H1) United States’ support for oppressive regimes within the Middle East increases antiAmericanism in the Middle East.
Does the United States support for oppressive and undemocratic governments
evoke anti-American sentiment in the Middle East? And, conversely, does US support for
democratic change within a Middle Eastern country incite pro-US sentiment? If this
hypothesis is confirmed, one would expect anti-Americanism to increase along with US
support for oppressive regimes, and to decrease with US support for democratic change
within a Middle Eastern country.
The empirical data uncovered by the quantitative analysis in Chapter Two
presents two different pictures. The first approach examined bivariate correlations
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between US support for oppressive regime indicators and public approval numbers over a
ten year span. The correlation data did not show a significant relationship between US
support indicators and public opinion of the US in the Middle East. Other than Turkey,
no other Middle Eastern country being studied showed any correlation at the .05 level.
However, as discussed throughout this study there are limitations to only using
quantitative analysis. Therefore, I compounded the statistical analysis with a qualitative
and descriptive statistical analysis of the relationship between US support for oppressive
governments and anti-Americanism levels throughout the region. The case of Lebanon
immediately stood out as an example of a Middle Eastern country that experienced a
democratic transition during this ten year study. The polling data before and after the
democratic transition allowed me to asses changes in public attitudes regarding the
United States. Furthermore, the US support indicators allowed me to analyze whether the
United States gave more support to the oppressive regime or to the democratic
government.
The analysis found that the United States gave much less support from 2002 until
2005 during the oppressive regime years. After 2005, the US support increased
dramatically. The public support for the US in Lebanon also increases by nearly 10% in
the years after the democratic transition. This shows that there is a significant correlation
between US support or lack of support for oppressive regimes and public approval of the
United States in the Middle East.
Based on the data presented in the qualitative statistical analysis, this study fails to
reject the hypothesis (H1) that claims there is a causal relationship between US support
for oppressive regimes and anti-American levels in the Middle East. The variable
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presented in this hypothesis doesn’t seem to be the only variable leading to antiAmericanism in the Middle East. However, the case of Lebanon shows both qualitative
and quantitative support for this hypothesis.

(H2) The United States’ support for Israel increases anti-Americanism in the Middle
East.
Does the United States’ support for Israel result in an increase of antiAmericanism in the Middle East? Does the Middle Eastern public at times equate Israel
with the United States? If the United States does not side with Israel, is it given any
credit? If this hypothesis is confirmed, one would expect anti-Americanism to increase
along with US support for Israel. The inverse relationship would also be expected.
The empirical data brought forth by the quantitative and qualitative analysis in
Chapter Three does show evidence in favor of this hypothesis (H2). The statistical
analysis showed that none of the cases being studied showed the hypothesized correlation
with four out of the five operational indicators. However, three out of the six countries
(Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco) did exhibit a strong correlation with United States’ UN
vetoes in favor of Israel. For example, when the US vetoed UN resolutions which were
critical of Israel, anti-Americanism increased in Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco. This is
also the most public form of US measured support for Israel, which could explain the
relationship.
Furthermore, the qualitative analysis of press releases and actions by Israel did
show evidence in support of a relationship between US support for Israel and antiAmericanism levels in the Middle East. The year 2006 stands out because the United
States did not call out Israel for invading Lebanon. The United States also went back on
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its support for democratic elections in the Palestinian territory when it saw that Hamas
won the majority of the vote. This same year also saw the United States veto two
resolutions that were critical of Israel. These actions resulted in a significant drop in
regional approval (10%) and a drop in approval in four out of the six countries being
studied. These findings show that US measured support as well as diplomatic statements
toward Israel correlate with anti-Americanism in the region.
Based on these findings, this study fails to reject the hypothesis (H2) that claims
there is a casual relationship between US support for Israel and levels of antiAmericanism in the Middle East. There was evidence in both the bivariate correlation
testing and the qualitative analysis that points to a relationship between US support and
approval of the US. This does not seem to be the only variable but it does account for a
significant decrease in approval of the US in 2006.

(H3) United States’ foreign interference in domestic affairs within the Middle East
increases anti-Americanism in the Middle East.
Does United States’ interference in the Middle East result in an increase in antiAmericanism within the region? Is there such thing as a legitimate intervention in the
Middle East? Or, are all interventions viewed negatively? Will isolationist policies lead
to more approval of the United States in the Middle East? If this hypothesis is confirmed,
one would expect to see public approval of the United States decrease along with
increased interference in domestic affairs by the United States.
Similar to Chapter Two and Three, the empirical data brought forth by the
quantitative analysis paints two different pictures. The bivariate analysis shows little
statistical significance between measures of US interventions and approval levels of the
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United States in the Middle East. None of the countries being studied showed a
correlation at the .05 level with levels of US troops in the region or with levels of civilian
casualties. However, this approach does not allow the researcher to go beyond the mere
numbers of troops levels and casualties. It leaves several questions unanswered. Does the
sudden appearance of troops during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 cause large increases
in anti-Americanism across the Middle Eastern region? Will approval of the US remain
low throughout the duration of the occupation? Or, can the US improve public approval
during the occupation period?
However, the qualitative analysis shows that there is a strong causal relationship
between US interventions and approval levels of the United States in the Middle East.
Between 2002 and 2003, when the US invaded Iraq, the average approval of the US
drops by nearly 16%. Four out of the six countries being studied witness their lowest
approval rating of the study in 2003, and Jordan and Morocco experience a drop in
approval by 24%, the largest of the study. This is overwhelming evidence that the
average Middle Eastern citizen strongly disagreed with the United States’ decision to
invade Iraq.
Based on these findings, this study fails to reject the hypothesis (H3) that claims
there is a relationship between US interference in domestic affairs within the Middle East
and approval levels of the United States in the Middle East. Although there was not a
strong statistical significance between the dependent variable and this independent
variable, the qualitative findings strongly support this hypothesis.
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(Null) The United States’ foreign policy within the Middle East does not affect public
approval levels of the United States in the Middle East.
Is there a relationship between US foreign policy and anti-Americanism in the
Middle East? Or, will those in the Middle East that view the US negatively, continue
these beliefs no matter what the US does? If this hypothesis is confirmed, one would
expect to see no correlation between the dependent variable (anti-Americanism) and any
of the independent variables.
The quantitative analysis in this study presents vastly different findings. A strong
bivariate correlation was not found between the three independent variables and the
dependent variable. However, this study also supplemented the bivariate analysis with a
descriptive statistical analysis and a qualitative analysis. In both Chapters Two and Four
there was a significant statistical correlation between the independent and dependent
variable. There are limits to bivariate statistical analysis, and viewed alone, it does not go
deep enough to accurately answer the research questions posed by this study. For this
reason, it was imperative to also use descriptive statistics along with qualitative analysis.
This study found evidence which supports the hypothesized relationship between both
US support for oppressive regimes and US intervention in domestic affairs with antiAmericanism in the Middle East.
Based on these findings, this study rejects the hypothesis (Null) that claims there
is not a relationship between anti-Americanism in the Middle East and US foreign policy
actions in the region. Both the descriptive statistical analysis and the qualitative analysis
found evidence of causation between two out of the three independent variables and the
dependent variable. I now move on to developing a theory on the connection of US
foreign policy and anti-Americanism in the Middle East.
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5.3 US Foreign Policy and Anti-Americanism Theory
This section briefly theorizes as to why anti-Americanism increases in the Middle
East, and its connection to US foreign policy. The empirical data in this study showed
that there is a causal relationship between US support for oppressive regimes and US
intervention in domestic affairs with anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Why was
there not a significant relationship between US support for Israel and approval levels of
the United States even though the literature highlighted this variable as a significant
factor?
This study’s empirical evidence leads one to theorize that anti-Americanism in the
Middle East increases when foreign policies are enacted which directly affect the
domestic lives of the Middle Eastern citizens in question. US support for Israel does not
directly affect the domestic lives of many of the citizens in the Middle East beyond the
Palestinians and Lebanese. Although US support for Israel remains important in Middle
Eastern politics, the average Middle Eastern citizen is more affected by US intervention
and living under oppressive regimes. This may explain why this variable does not have as
strong of a causal relationship that US support for oppressive regimes and US
intervention in domestic affairs do in this study. This does not discount the importance of
the United States’ support for Israel and its impact on Middle Eastern public opinion.
However, this theory does explain this study’s findings.
While measured US support for Israel did not change during this study, US
support for oppressive regimes and US intervention in the Middle East did shift. In both
cases there was quantitative and qualitative evidence that points to a causal relationship
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with these variables and anti-Americanism in the Middle East. If these hypotheses are
accurate, these US policies will contribute to lower levels of anti-Americanism in the
region. I now move to what this study’s findings mean for US policy makers.

5.4 US Foreign Policy Implications
Based on this study’s findings that US foreign policy does correlate with antiAmericanism in the region, it is important to assess whether or not future foreign policy
decisions can reverse these negative views of the United States. Scholars such as Barry
Rubin, Samuel Huntington, and Bernard Lewis insist that Middle Eastern antiAmericanism is a result of failed societies and a clash of cultures, and that the United
States can do nothing to reverse these anti-American trends. 404 However, if foreign policy
is a catalyst to anti-Americanism in the Middle East, than it is possible for the United
States to reverse these trends. What can US policy makers do to reverse negative views of
the United States in the Middle East? Will changes in US foreign policy completely solve
the problem of anti-Americanism in the Middle East?

US Support for Oppressive Regimes
As explained in Chapter Two, the United States has a history of supporting
oppressive governments throughout the Middle East, and these decisions have led to
distrust and resentment that resonates throughout the region. Although a great deal of this
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support goes back to the founding of the Modern Middle East, the recent unraveling of
several oppressive regimes presents an important opportunity for US policy makers.
The case of Lebanon shares many parallels to the simultaneous political uprisings
which began in January 2011 known as the “Arab Spring.” 405 In the case of Lebanon’s
Cedar Revolution, Lebanese citizens began protesting the Syrian occupation of the
country, and in April of 2005 the last Syrian troops and authorities exited the country. 406
The United States gave little support to Lebanon during the Syrian occupation period, and
then began supporting the uprising in 2005 and the democratic government following
Syria’s exit from the country. This resulted in nearly a ten point increase in public
approval of the United States in Lebanon in the years after the Cedar Revolution. Each
year after 2005, Lebanon has the highest public approval of the United States in this
study, which was not the case before 2005. This shows that the United States can change
public opinion in the Middle East.
Based on the empirical findings in Chapter Two, I would advise US policy
makers to use the case of Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution as a model for how to handle the
ongoing political uprisings of the Arab Spring. This exact scenario cannot be applied to
every country in the region, but it can remain an example of an effective policy. For
example, the United States supported President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, therefore it will
not have as much legitimacy as it did in Lebanon when it did not support the oppressive
Syrian occupation. However, supporting the protesters and the democratic transition no
matter the results will add to US legitimacy in Egypt. Each country must be assessed on a
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case by case basis, but an overarching policy for democratic transition in the region
should be adopted. For example, the Obama Administration should not publicly support
protests in Libya and Egypt while remaining silent during similar protests in Bahrain.
Although the United States did delay arm sales to Bahrain, it went ahead with arm sales
which were opposed by human rights’ groups such as Freedom House, Amnesty
International, and Human Rights Watch. 407 These foreign policy actions undermine US
legitimacy in the region, and only add to the narrative of distrust that spawns antiAmericanism.

US Support for Israel
As explained in Chapter Three, the United States historical relationship with
Israel has been a source of anti-Americanism in the Middle East. This has been such a
close relationship that Marc Lynch argues that many in the Middle East see Israel and the
United States as one in the same. 408 The quantitative and qualitative analysis in this study
also established a correlation between US support for Israel and public approval of the
United States. While some of the operational indicators did not show a correlation, these
were also the variables that remained stable. US vetoes of UN resolutions critical to Israel
were very public indicators of support and did show a strong correlation with approval
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levels of the US. This study also found that diplomatic statements by the US and
unilateral actions undertaken by Israel can cause decreases in approval of the US.
It would be unrealistic for this study to recommend that the United States distance
itself from Israel. Israel is a strategic ally in the region, and many policy makers believe
that it is in the United States’ national interest to remain close with Israel. Mearsheimer
and Walt would also argue that no US president would be elected without support from
pro-Israel lobbies such as AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee). 409 The
most adequate way to curb anti-Americanism as a result of US support for Israel is to
improve relations between Israel and its neighbors in the region. The most effective way
to accomplish this is to achieve a solution to the Palestinian question. A two-state
solution and permanent home for Palestinians would help to alleviate anti-Israeli and
anti-American sentiment within the region. This would both allow the United States to
remain allied to Israel while improving views of the US in the region. Unilateral
recognition of a Palestinian state would make huge steps toward achieving this. Although
Israel would not be happy with move, it would remain an ally of the United States. Many
in the Middle Eastern community would then believe that the United States was serious
about achieving a solution to the Palestinian question, and this would greatly improve the
image of the US in the Middle East.
US Intervention in Domestic Affairs
As discussed in Chapter Four, US intervention in the Middle East has been a
catalyst for anti-Americanism both historically and during the time period being studied.
The 2003 war in Iraq saw the largest decreases of approval of the US in this study, and it
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remains a source of distrust to this day. However, this study also found that not all
interventions are viewed in the same light and that different types of interventions can be
viewed as more legitimate than others.
Based on this study’s findings, US foreign policy makers should attempt to avoid
any intervention within the Middle East. However, if it is in the United States’ best
interest to intervene, it should use the 2011 Libyan intervention as a model. Achieiving
legitimacy in the Middle East is essential. For a US intervention in the Middle East to be
considered legitimate it should: 1) not involve ground troops or an occupation force, 2)
consist of no fly zones, 3) have a broad international coalition, 4) be facilitated by
international organizations such as the UN, 5) receive support from regional actors
including the Arab League, and 6) it should have an accomplishable goal that can be
achieved quickly. Even if all of these conditions are met, an intervention could still result
in anti-American sentiment. However, it would be less severe and short lived than an
“illegitimate” intervention. This type of intervention should be avoided at all costs, as it
would lead to huge increases of anti-Americanism within the region.
Aside from the foreign policy actions addressed in this study, US policy makers
could also focus on public diplomacy within the region. Working with NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) and think tanks, the United States could work on
improving its image in the region. Policy makers, politicians, and military leaders in the
United States should also be required to participate in workshops with these NGOs that
can teach them about Middle Eastern culture and Islam. This would help to eliminate
stereotypes and misperception of Islam and the Middle East.
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5.5 Conclusion: Suggestions for Future Research
This study analyzed public approval ratings of the United States over a ten year
period while examining three separate US foreign policy actions. It determined that two
out of the three foreign policy actions (US support for oppressive regimes and US
intervention in domestic affairs) are causally linked to Middle Eastern views of the
United States. The topic of terrorism and its link to anti-Americanism is a relatively new
topic within international relations, and there are many facets within this topic that have
yet to be fully explored.
Future research should not homogenize the many different groups within the
“Middle East.” The public opinion polls used by this study did not allow the researcher to
control for age, sex, occupation, income level, level of religiosity, etc. This leaves many
questions unanswered. Does age or sex play a role in how those in the Middle East view
the United States? Does occupation play a role? Or, are those with low income levels
more susceptible to anti-American sentiment? Future researchers should compare antiAmericanism levels between young and old, women and men, rich and poor, more
religious to less religious, and so on. This would allow the researcher to determine which
group has the most favorable and least favorable views of the United States, and this
information could uncover the US foreign policy actions that affect these groups the
most. For example, militant Islamists will have very different views of the United States
than a moderately religious business man, and an Islamist might be more likely to view
any US intervention as hostile. It is unlikely that any US policy will satisfy this militant
Islamist group, but this remains a small portion of the Middle East public. Further
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research can help to distinguish between these different groups. Understanding these
different views will be very beneficial to both scholars and US policy makers.
Future research could also investigate human rights abuses undertaken by a
minority of US troops during the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Human rights abuses such
as those at Abu Ghraib and the alleged abuses at Guantanamo Bay do not illicit positive
views of the United States. In Afghanistan, a small number of US troops were also caught
burning the Quran and urinating on dead Taliban soldiers which led to massive antiAmerican riots. 410 To what extent do these events affect public opinion of the United
States? Even though this has been an extremely small group of US troops, these stories
are often on headlines across the Middle Eastern world and could be a significant factor
in anti-Americanism.
Furthermore, future researchers can study public opinion over a longer period of
time. This will allow scholars to analyze more shifts in public views and allow for the
possibility of introducing new variables. Scholars could also visit the region to perform
their own opinion polling with the possibility of conducting face to face interviews. This
will allow researchers to dig deeper into the causes of anti-Americanism and possibly
arrive with new solutions. This would be most beneficial to asses public attitudes post
Arab Spring. Will Tunisians, Egyptians, and Libyans view the United States differently
now that they are living under different governments?
Samuel Huntington, Bernard Lewis, and others argue that there is nothing the
United States can do to prevent the rise of anti-Americanism. 411 However, this study
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shows that US foreign policy has a causal relationship with anti-Americanism in the
Middle East. US foreign policy decisions such as supporting oppressive regimes and
intervening in domestic affairs are contributing factors to the increase of antiAmericanism. It will not be a quick or easy task for the United States to start changing
perceptions in the Middle East, but opinions can be changed. A history of these foreign
policy decisions has created a culture of distrust. Changing this culture will take time, but
many in the Middle East are open to improving relations with the United States. In his
Gallup world poll, John Esposito found that a large percentage of Muslims want better
relations with the United States. 412 Esposito writes, “The long war against terror will not
be won on the battlefield, but by winning the loyalty of the people in the region.” 413 For
the United States to change this culture of distrust and curb anti-Americanism in the
Middle East, it must win back hearts and minds.
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Chapter Four
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